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Abstract
Disputed territories and territorial disputes alike are frequent fixtures at the core of
foreign affairs and international discourse. In a world that seems increasingly interconnected, it
is difficult to imagine how anything could escape observation, let alone powerful countries
operating outside the scope of international legal bodies’ rules and enforcements regarding
territorial disputes. Disputed territory within the periphery regions of the world offer nations a
unique opportunity to act in complete self-interest and operate in a liminal space largely free
from the rigid constructions and norms of the global core. The significant state dynamics and
drivers that manifest in these geopolitical situations may help reveal the countries’ intentions for
the center stage of the global political sphere down the line. This work explores four different
environmental areas, the Arctic, maritime zones, land, and outer space, as well as multiple case
studies of the periphery impact on disputed territories and why further study of this phenomenon
is a valuable tool in effectual foreign policy analysis.
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Introduction
Territory is a means of viewing the world comfortably. To see state ownership and
associate belongingness with a given possession over an environment is a way to feasibly clarify
which pieces of our geopolitical composition fit into their distinct and tangible spots. Adherence
to the rules and norms of territory and the involved foreign relations is how we have progressed
beyond eras of conquest and exploration, always searching for some corner of the world yet to be
defined by the powers at be. However, even after all the history that has unfolded, the world is
not absent of these uncharted areas. In actuality, they are far more plentiful and important to
better understanding an increasingly dynamic global order than ever. Disputed territories are
everywhere, there are hundreds of them mapped and charted in cartographic databases and
covered in major news outlets each and every day; the current Russian and Ukrainian conflict
occurring presently is in a sense, a war based on disputed territory1.
In establishing that disputed territories are plentiful, it is also key to point out that certain
types of conflicts regarding territory provide more insight than others given the space they exist
in, or the way in which they are perceived by the international community at large. Territorial
disputes that are not being charted or well covered, the ones that may escape a more traditional
conceptualization of what constitutes territory, or even those simply located in distant or obscure
areas, these are the state interactions to be observed closely: the disputed territories that reside in
the periphery.

1

Max Galka, “Every Disputed Territory in the World [Interactive Map],” Every Disputed
Territory in the World [Interactive Map] (OpenStreetMap, November 20, 2015),
http://metrocosm.com/disputed-territories-map.html.
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The periphery as a conceptual realm for disputed territories to exist rests in this notion of
liminality, a transitionary of middle state that is ambiguous in its composition and is frequently a
place where “established structures are dislocated”2. It is more or less a twilight zone of foreign
affairs, nothing so out of the ordinary that would attract intentional attention, but states can and
will act differently as the typical or core laws, institutions, and norms are marginally present or
entirely absent from these spaces. This is extremely useful for states, as without the typical
structures and conventions that limit illicit activities in the global core, countries may act in
complete self-interest regarding their objectives for power, economic gain, military projection, or
any number of geopolitical goals. Without the international organizations and presiding bodies to
enforce the laws, because there likely are not any to begin with or the ones that exist are illdefined, the periphery offers a seemingly idyllic environment for states to behave how they
please with regard to a disputed territory.
However, there is a caveat to this seemingly paradisal loophole in foreign affairs over
disputed regions. In order to maintain this periphery status, states must uphold a carefully
cooperative nature amongst themselves. This seems incongruous to the point of engaging over a
disputed territory, as the objective would likely be for a single state to take over that region for
their own goals and plans. Alas, that type of outward conflict is what would pull the disputed
territory out of the periphery, into the center of global attention, and thus all the benefits that
states might be reaping from these disputed territories, economic, political, or geopolitical, would
be lost. Countries must then essentially share the disputed territory in the periphery amongst one

2

Maria Mälskoo, “The Challenge of Liminality for International Relations Theory,” Review of
International Studies 38, no. 2 (2012): pp. 481-494,
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210511000829, 481.
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another and afford even rivalling nations a certain share of the resources available so to not forgo
the liminal existence.
The periphery provides states the ability to act in their own self-interest, but demands
adversarial cooperation to maintain those benefits, creating a uniquely valuable window of
perspicacity for state interaction within these disputed territories. Observing how nations and
state actors operate in the periphery can help determine the objectives and future actions of the
involved nations. Disputed territories in the periphery offer an opportunity for complete selfinterest, and the countries involved can feasibly test their ideas and plans, so long as they do not
involve sizable conflict, without repercussions. This in turn stands to reveal much more about
countries that might otherwise remain black boxes of information, as without prescribed rules,
laws, and norms, and so long as they engage without clashing, states can act with an
advantageous candor that cannot exist in the global core.
To examine this theory in context, case studies in different environments of peripheral
territorial disputes are analyzed to demonstrate this liminality and how it exists in practice. The
Arctic, maritime zones such as oceans and seas, land, as well as outer space and celestial bodies
serve as different examples of how this phenomenon plays out amongst very different states in
entirely unique situations, but the attributes of the periphery and its impact on countries and
disputed territory remains constant.
This thesis is rooted in the notion that the frequently overlooked, understudied,
essentially periphery regions of the world, and the disputed territories contained within, have
immeasurable value in the practice of better understanding and potentially predicting or
accounting for international affairs and foreign relations. The liminality of the periphery is such a
specific and ephemeral dynamic for states to reside in, and what occurs in that space can offer

5

insight and a better comprehension as to how the global community interacts currently, and what
may unfold in the future.
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The Arctic
The Arctic region in geopolitics is a space frequently defined by its inaccessibility or
remoteness, and thus how other nations define it within those constraints. This region is plentiful
in natural resources, unincorporated, and comprises a massive territory. It is a fluid environment
of unsettled boundaries, and a significant example of a peripheral disputed territory in
international politics. The Arctic as an anarchic space, one defined by its lack of defining
borders, as well as its distant proximity from the center stage of global territorial disputes should
render it a region opportune for international infighting amongst the global powers. However,
this distant placement and inhospitable nature is exactly what maintains the Arctic’s background
existence within foreign affairs, leaving the states that do choose to endeavor in attempting to
claim the plentiful resources, largely unmonitored.
The absence of “overarching political and legal structures” that would normally “provide
for orderly development of the region” means that the duality of the region’s distant proximity
and the lack of global communal attention leaves room for “dangerous” territorial overreach by
certain global powers3. Moreover, the ambiguity of arctic territorial ownership or possession
leaves space for global powers to overstep typical territorial norms with various unchecked
justifications to support their geopolitical movements and the capture of natural resources, all
this being an eventual gateway for militarization.
Just as the Arctic’s territorial ambiguity serves to benefit those seeking to take advantage
of its periphery status, the act of making it a calculable territory also poses immense challenges
to the global community and its bodies like the UN. This would require powerful bodies such as
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Scott Borgerson. “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global
Warming,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 2 (2008): 78.
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Russia, the United States, Canada, or Scandinavian countries to reconcile with the benefits they
reap from the Arctic’s periphery status in their own utilization of that. The trade-off of bringing
periphery areas to the forefront for the sake of stopping a competing global power from utilizing
its resources means forsaking these unmonitored benefits for all. This chapter aims to discuss
these very actors, those who reside inside the Arctic region and outside of it, all in the context of
a theoretical explanation for their actions within this periphery space.

Constructing the Cold
To start, Constructivism’s emphasis on the range of intangible and ideational values, as
well as the change over time in practices is useful in regarding the vagueness of the Arctic; a
region largely absent of any laws, boundaries, or defined ownership. Territorial definitions can
be the foundations for the constructions of sovereignty. By characterizing a territory as anything
from stable to uncharted or vast to uninhabitable, the terminology used in defining a region is
key to states’ perceptions and actions toward and on it. With specific mention to the Arctic,
states frequently “perpetuate” the assumed ways of “defining and delimiting sovereign
jurisdiction”4. The sovereignty in the Arctic is reflective of the region’s complexity; its
materiality that exists as both land and water is indicative of the individual state, and its
construction of territorial advancement intention that hinges on how the space is defined. For
example, an exploration of shipping routes through the Arctic, like expanding the Northwest
Passage, could offer invaluable maritime accessibility and control over the territory, and
potential trade and transit accessibility that could prove to be immensely lucrative.

4

Hannes Gerhardt et al., “Contested Sovereignty in a Changing Arctic,” Annals of the
Association of American Geographers 100, no. 4 (2010): pp. 992-994,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2010.500560.
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Constructing the reason for the pursuit of claim over the Arctic is also an important factor
in how states define or legitimize their efforts. If the region is viewed as a fixed place or
territory, the notion of proximity to it, especially in the case of Canada or Russia, can be used as
justification for ownership. Seeing the area as uncharted and static, which is tied to its
inhabitable nature and lack of actual land, the cultivation of the Arctic identity as this
untouchable region, resigned to the periphery, allows for undisturbed state activities. The most
consistent construction is one that is held by the United States, a viewpoint that the Arctic is not
technically land, just water and frozen water, thus it is beyond the claim of state territory5. In
doing this, any flag-planting or claims placed on the Arctic are rendered insignificant or futile, as
this construction fails to align with the applicability of territorial claim.
Perhaps the most solid example of Constructivism is the Arctic Council, a specific
presiding body over the region that maintains no actual legal authority beyond environmental
and sustainable protections. The construction of a legal body that is in actuality symbolic, and
limited in its foreign policy related efficacy has ensured that fundamental protections of the
environment and the Arctic indigenous people are in place, but any politically related decisions,
such as accessibility of the region in terms of territorial expansion, remain undefined6. The
“ideational dimension” of the Arctic exists in how nations define it, and what tools they use to do
so7. This formation of discourses and cooperation surrounding the definition of a space like the
Arctic is one that is transactional between states and their intentions. The dispute between states

5

Pier Horensma, The Soviet Arctic (London: Routledge, 1991).
Hannes Gerhardt et al., “Contested Sovereignty in a Changing Arctic,” Annals of the
Association of American Geographers 100, no. 4 (2010): pp. 992-1002.
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Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution?” International Politics 55, no. 2 (March 2017): p.
153, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0074-4.
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in sharing what “ideas or beliefs with respect to each other”, thus where these constructions are
“grounded” in, means that discourse on something such as territory is powerful8; It can shape not
just the behavior of the state, but all states within the given situation.
Constructing the Arctic and engaging in the effort to define it as a territory with rules,
laws, and specific procedures when operating in the region must be collaborative. Constructivism
conceptualizes institutions as a “collection” of important norms, rules, and routines, rather than a
specific structure, so this cooperation would not need to be within an oversight body such as the
UN or Arctic Council, but it would need to be a shared action9. If not, or if one state or a specific
coalition of states acts on behalf of all nations involved, it can foster animosity or the perception
that an imbalanced structure is coming to fruition, one that might unfairly serve the states’
interests who set the precedent.

Arctic Actuality
A “liminal environment”, a region that exists outside the normal constructions of what
land or territory is thought to be by standard and binary definitions10. This type of existence
within the situation of disputed territory begs state actors to define the space for themselves,
which often manifests as self-interestedly. At the same time, this vague existence of a periphery
zone facilitates the expectation for other states to act in the same self-interested manner.
Countries might also work collaboratively in smaller alliances within the area to potentially enter
a structural contract. Any of these avenues run the risk of limiting or destroying the foggy

8

Ibid.
Ibid, 154.
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Association of American Geographers 100, no. 4 (2010): pp. 996,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2010.500560.
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sovereignty and its ill-defined rules that benefit all states operating in the liminality of the
periphery.
The dynamic existence of the Arctic, the other realms to be discussed in this work, and
what the involved states want with a periphery disputed territory is complex and varied;
everything from claims of a tangible space for opportunity, utility of trade routes, and
environmental protections. Moreover, a literally ever-changing landscape due to climate change
will only serve to render what may be currently useful constructions, inapplicable, given the
uncertain future of the Arctic itself.
The Arctic is a region that if controlled or definitively positioned to a point of ownership
by a certain country offers an immense amount of territorial, thus political, and economic
control. There are countries that maintain “near-Arctic state” status such as Canada, Scandinavia,
Russia, and the United States, which all hold seats on the Arctic Council thus having definitive
control over Arctic governance. There are also nations that may have vested interest in the Arctic
and its affairs, but do not fit the “council’s lexicon” of being a near-Arctic state: countries like
China, India, South Korea, and Singapore are afforded observer status11. The designation of a
near-Arctic state over observer demonstrates the role of proximity in claiming territorial
ownership over the Arctic.
The Council itself as mentioned previously does not maintain significant control nor
imparts specific legislation, but the power held by the status of being designated a near-Arctic
state implies legitimacy of actions in the region. Proximity to the Arctic is a key attribute to have
in fulfilling the construction of what a near-Arctic state should be, even in the periphery, and
11

Reuters Staff, “U.S. Rejects Interference by Non-Arctic Countries in Polar Region: Official,”
Reuters (Thomson Reuters, May 2, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pompeoarctic-idUSKCN1S8299.
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since a country’s physical location is not something feasibly changed, it proves challenging for
those without governing status in the Arctic Council to exert any actions in the region that will
not attract unwanted spectatorship from the global core.
Because the Arctic maintains this distant proximity from mainstream global affairs, it is
in the best interest of countries who aim to operate there to maintain the least amount of
international attention as possible. China is one of the central states hindered by this construction
of being outside the states seen as legitimate actors in the region, and thus faces the paradox of
asserting why it is justified in operating there without drawing unneeded scrutiny to the Arctic
and its periphery existence.

Tactical Observation
China’s position on what kind of territory the Arctic is, is not necessarily at the forefront
of their perspective on and interest for the region, instead it is viewed as simply a space for
“competition”12. Their pursuit of power in the Arctic is hindered by their status of observer
instead of near-Arctic state, yet that goes almost entirely unmentioned in the country’s public
facing documents. This is likely an intentional act, as cultivating an “identity” as a near-Arctic
state when the Arctic Council’s construction of what an near-Arctic state is remains complicated
and vague13. China’s motivations in the region are largely focused on expanding their military
prowess and making use of the plentiful resources in the territory, but outwardly maintaining a
supportive position that aligns with the key goals of the Arctic Council, such as environmental
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Rush Doshi, Alexis Dale-Huang, and Gaoqi Zhang, “Northern Expedition: China's Arctic
Activities and Ambitions,” Brookings (Brookings, August 20, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/northern-expedition-chinas-arctic-activities-and-ambitions/.
13
Ibid.
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protections, is of high importance. The use of Chinses naval vessels on goodwill visits to
countries on the Council such as Sweden and Finland, the investment in indigenously produced
icebreakers, as well as the ten research expeditions sent in recent years have put forth the
presentation of a scientifically focused military profile in the region14. These actions move to
expand China’s operational experience in the Arctic, and a visible commitment to the ideas and
communality of the Council could be a means of achieving greater regional access.
Even if these efforts do help China’s case for legitimacy within the region, it still does
not change the fact that China does not share coastline with the Arctic and cannot feasibly claim
legitimacy through proximity. This being one of, if not the key component to what makes a
state’s position on the Arctic Council legitimate, China’s route of infrastructural investments is
seemingly an attempt at a close approximation. In pursuing projects that seem to have marginal
economic benefit, such as the purchasing of land in Iceland and Norway’s Svalbard archipelago,
as well as the venture to purchase defunct naval bases scattered across Scandinavian territory,
China can slowly establish itself regionally and continue to foster this trust with key arctic actors.
The work to translate Beijing’s desire for recognition as an arctic actor, thus more access to the
region, mechanisms of sharing scientific resources, investing, and aligning with the proposed
goals of the Council help to build an arctic identity. China’s activities in the Arctic serve in
bolstering a territorial narrative by showing that the state while not “near-Arctic” in location, is
already within the region and operational, creating its own unique peripheral “polar identity”15.

14

Ibid.
Mia M. Bennett, “How China Sees the Arctic: Reading between Extraregional and
Intraregional Narratives,” Geopolitics 20, no. 3 (2015): p. 655,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2015.1017757.
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In using China as a case study to exemplify the challenges of operating within a liminal
periphery territory such as the Arctic, one of the core attributes needed in acting and eventually
claiming the space is fulfilling attributes of a state given legitimacy by a governing body and
upheld in construction of the peripheral environment. In this instance, proximity to the Arctic
along with alignment in the Arctic Council’s goals is paramount, and while China could at least
engage in actions that seemingly fit the environmental and scientific objectives, its location as a
country is permanent. However, the strategic investment in particularly former military
properties throughout the Scandinavian region speak to the long-term goals the country has.
China’s actions demonstrate a loophole of sorts in the importance of proximity to a periphery
region regarding laying claim to legitimate operations there. Further, an observer status on the
Arctic council may have been a constructed obstacle for China in achieving its own arctic goals,
but in actuality, it has found a feasible way to operate from a distance and still reap a certain
amount of the periphery benefits of the Arctic.

Connivance Diplomacy
The coveted position of being considered a near-Arctic state, thus having legitimacy in
operating within the Arctic, is something that states can use to their benefit in the already
anarchic region. Countries on the Arctic Council possess not only locality to the Arctic, but their
activities in the region do not draw initial global attention because they are already occupying the
space to begin with. Moreover, the Arctic in its periphery status as a disputed territory attracts
limited global attention, despite the plentiful resources and global power at stake depending on if
and when a state attempts to take control.
The states on the Arctic Council have it in their best interest to characterize the council
itself as a “multiplicity of in-between positions” so to enable the countries to “negotiate and
14

exploit ambivalent spaces”16. Because of the freedom that states like Russia, or the United States
have within an ill-defined, periphery region, compiled with the loosely constructed authority of
the Arctic Council, an exclusive environment where geopolitical agendas can be advanced,
mostly undisturbed, is created. This creation of a “connivance diplomacy” facilitates an almost
oligarchical structure of near-Arctic states who decide how to define the Arctic amongst
themselves, and for the rest of the global audience17. The notion of connivance is evident in the
affordance of power that these states wield in the Arctic without the typical, center-stage display
of power that is normally seen with territorial disputes. The subtle, yet impactful enforcements
such as designating proximal hierarchy in arctic political endeavors are even more significant
because of the self-governing nature of the periphery. The lack of attention on the Arctic from
the global community save for those operating within it or living directly near it allows for such
an unusual display of careful cooperation and strategy from typically extrinsically adversarial
states such as the United States and Russia. However, this is not to say that burgeoning power
struggles do not exist in the Arctic, they just take on a different, more individually driven form,
largely seen with the inside actors, the near-Arctic States: the council members.

Russian Repercussions
Regarding proximity in the Arctic, the states given permission to act and have a say in
any kind of policy or tangible changes to the region are those that reside “inside”. The countries
with positions on the Arctic Council have a strategic advantage in defining their place, purpose,
and intentions in the Arctic region. A country like Russia has enormous, vested interest in the
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Nikolas Sellheim, Yulia V. Zaika, and Ilan Kelman, Arctic Triumph: Northern Innovation and
Persistence (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019).174.
17
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region, with the economic promise of the natural resources and vast maritime control any form of
ownership might bring, it is expected that Russia is active in the region. There is a significant
history with Russia’s presence in the Arctic though, one that shapes how proximity and the
periphery play an important factor in its actions and decisions.
Russia’s dynamic in the arctic was a colonial endeavor, the exploration of the region
dating back into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries showed that flagging, mapping, and
charting the Arctic were activities done in tandem with the “development of imperial trading
networks, administrative apparatuses, and regime development”18. This historical connection to
the region along with the colonialist constructed identity of exploration thus ownership, Russia’s
actions and presence in the Arctic carries the weight of not just the largest state, but the most
legitimized in its own viewpoint.
The importance of the Arctic in geopolitics is its position in the periphery of the global
stage and in the theoretical perception of disputed territories. The remoteness from the central
happenings in global affairs is what makes it an idyllic region for states to create their own rules,
and act in self-interest with limited and ill-defined legislation. However, Russia serves as a case
study for how quickly this kind of unique environment afforded by its residence in the periphery
can be removed by a show of force. In 2007, a Russian oceanographic expedition resulted in
research and scientific materials that the country submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf as a means for asking and likely expecting permission to extend their
“sovereign rights to exploit resources” on and below the seabed but presented as seeking
approval for further scientific exploration19.
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Nikolas Sellheim, Yulia V. Zaika, and Ilan Kelman, Arctic Triumph: Northern Innovation and
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To move forward with approvals in this region, a state simply needs a “recommendation”
as a legal judgement, and when the Commission was unable to issue the grant pertinent to the
situation, a request for further research to be done was made. However, Russia instead went
ahead with their expedition via submarine, and publicly displayed their national flag on the
seabed20. All of this fostered a situation where Russia saw an opportunity for laying claim to a
very large scale of underwater disputed territory, as well as challenge vague periphery ruling
body, and thus engaged in “flag-planting” or claiming the territory, openly, to be Russian21.
This incident was one of the few that grabbed global attention and directed it toward the
Arctic, showing the liminality of a periphery status, and demonstrating how an inside state, even
within a periphery environment, can disturb the careful balance should it seek too much power.
Moreover, the flag-planting connects back to Russia’s construction of its place in the Arctic, and
why that self-interested view of rightful ownership harkening back to its colonial and imperial
pursuits, can prove problematic in the future. The Russian flag-planting episode demonstrated
that regardless of the political, financial, or legal “provenance” of something like a research
mission, which was ultimately what the nation was pursuing a “recommendation” for, can
unleash geopolitical fears over a region normally thought to be unimportant due to its periphery
existence22.
While something as antiquated as a literal flag-planting seems inconsequential, its echo
of early, almost feudal encounters in the pursuit of geographical power, and the international
reaction and attention brought attention to the Arctic that had not been there previously is
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significant. Essentially the existence of a “thinly governed space” is dependent on the state actors
within that environment refraining from open and outright movements toward territorial claim,
instead operating without firm constructions of shared territorial possession23.
Whether the Russian flag-planting was a reconstructed memory of their past arctic
imperialist adventures or an intentional activity, it demonstrates the larger qualm at the center of
periphery regions and those who operate within them. With greater numbers of states wanting to
join the Arctic Council, or even those seeking observer status, the larger the group of countries
operating within a periphery area will diminish the benefits that come with that space. Russia’s
claim of ownership directed global attention on the region, and whether the hope was for the
world to view Russia as the rightful owner or just to dissuade others from attempting their own
form of flag-planting, it demonstrated that the liminality of the periphery and its promise can be
diminished by a single powerful state attempting a takeover.
The activities within a periphery region in accordance with the lack of oversight and
normal foreign policy constraints can only function with group benefit if the members of that
cooperative refrain from attention-grabbing activities such as conflict. Russia possesses a large
amount of control in this dynamic because of its territorial expanse, as it does expand over the
most area in the Arctic, and the above-mentioned self-perceived rightfulness to be claim the
Arctic as its own due to historical presence and pursuits; within these constructions Russia is the
dominant regional state. With this status both intrinsically and extrinsically comes responsibility
and power, which may be wielded for individual gain or group benefit. With geopolitical
relationships existing outside the Arctic potentially influencing how states operate within it, it
would be unsurprising if Russia or other insiders engaged in similar flag-planting styled actions.

23
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North by North America
The United States has often been viewed as a “reluctant Arctic actor”; certainly, a
powerful state with a seat at the Arctic Council in addition to having a keen interest in the
environmental and economic concerns and potentials of the region24. Over various presidencies,
American focus on the Arctic has shifted from fossil fuel collection to environmental protections,
but has largely stayed distanced from the rest of U.S. foreign policy even with the recent Head of
the Arctic Council tenure.
A periphery territory benefits those who reside or operate within it by lacking certain
structures of a more central environment. The attention of the global community toward disputed
territories is usually due to the breaking of laws or norms amongst states vying for said territory
in the form of conflict. More than that, the creation of a narrative around a disputed territory, the
framing of it, is a key element in how the territory itself is viewed and regulated, or not.
Regarding the United States, framing theory plays a central role in how America views
the Arctic and its role there25. To define framing theory, it is the outlook regarding how best to
position or portray a situation in international politics to bring about an intended outcome26.
Through framing theory, a state, such as the United States, has the capacity to frame its role
within the Arctic, or other nations’ capacities, legitimacies, or intentions. More importantly,
America’s use of evaluative framing in structuring the reference point to which the external
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environment, the Arctic, is compared, the use of stronger areas of interest for U.S. purpose in the
Arctic, such as conflict and strategy, or development and competitiveness, are realized27.
Cooperation in such a loosely defined region like the Arctic is not necessarily in line with
the United States and its typically realism-oriented strategies, but the shaping of American
purpose in the Arctic by the country itself helps clarify a role. Thus, framing theory is applicable
to all the Arctic states discussed thus far. With China attempting to define its place as an
operational outside state, Russia enmeshing historical imperialist identity with its modern-day
global great power in tempting a declared ownership of the region, and the United States looking
for driver to define its strategy and purpose, a periphery territory and the absence of typical laws
and norms forces states to construct their own in a way.
The utilization of framing theory to construct America’s purpose thus role in the Arctic is
seen in the careful composing of their actions for the state itself. By viewing arctic leadership as
a “supremacy game”, one that requires “winning or losing” and “displays of power” or simply as
a “decision-making” and “virtue-ethics” driven superpower, the U.S. is able to maintain its
disinterested presence in the region as well as its role as a superpower with insider status28.
Climate change created a new frame for U.S. power in the Arctic post-1996 creation of the
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). This formal diplomatic body on such a specific issue
meant that this periphery environment now had a defining challenge for all states operating
within the region to contend with. Moreover, climate change could and would force the Arctic
into a very public area for the global community to view. Additionally, the impacts on the
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livelihoods of indigenous peoples as well as the scientific warnings were not to be ignored and
would force specific diplomatic action and discussions in the region in the late 1990’s29.

Climate Change and Coherency
The recognition of climate change and its detrimental impacts by the United States in
specific is significant because it forced the creation of the constructed insider and outsider
identity, with pointed mention to how the states within the Arctic viewed themselves and one
another. This construction surrounding a universal issue that recognized the role of increasing
human activity in the Arctic, a growing awareness of the fragility yet opportunity of the Arctic
itself, as well as establishing the ongoing work of the Arctic Council, meant that policy goals did
not necessarily shift, but were re-framed. With the necessity for positive cooperation rather than
enfranchisement and transformation of the Arctic Council, the U.S. lead the way in fostering
collaboration between the insider states of the Arctic. In strengthening their communal view of
legitimacy and power in the region as well as fostering a commitment to maintaining the Arctic’s
periphery status and distance from the global limelight, the directive to not formalize the Arctic
arrangement was solidified30.
The importance of a shared political or policy outlook, especially in periphery disputed
territories, is integral to ensuring that the states operating within such liminal environments
maintain an ordered relationship so to not attract the attention of the global community. In the
Arctic, the “coherence” of policies depends on the commonality of objectives and ideas held by a
given group of states, and in doing that, the policies of the Arctic Council, such as designating
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which states are Near-Arctic or Insider, and which are not, helps establish policy coherence31.
Policymaking and state actions in a periphery environment are driven not by formal or classical
structures and regulations, but by communality and a mutual understanding between states of
their abilities and limitations so to maintain the unrestricted constructed environment. The
American political empowerment in the Arctic, sustained by its insider status and thus power in
the region, helps direct this coherency and afford a careful balance between normally adversarial
states, such as Russia, to maintain the self-interest driven benefits found periphery environments
like the Arctic32.
The main obstacle for upholding this coherency lays in the outside forces impacting the
Arctic, the key example being climate change. As mentioned previously, the Arctic as an
environment is framed as an untouchable and stagnant area, but with the global warming induced
physical changes, countries will be forced to establish their goals and policy decisions more
concretely, in addition to contending with the likely global attention to the area.
The drastic change of the defining features of the Arctic, the frozen landscape, and
international concern of global climate politics has the capacity to force the Arctic out of its
periphery existence, which by proxy forces the Arctic states and their actions into the spotlight as
well. American political actions in the Arctic since the late 90’s have been increasingly shaped
by climate change and the respective administrational outlook on climate science or skepticism.
The greatest challenge lies ahead in the difficult navigation of the tension between environmental
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protection and the desire to capture economic opportunities, all within the context of not being
the first state to violate the coherency amongst arctic states, but also not to be the last33.
Overarchingly, the United States’ role in the Arctic has evolved substantially over time.
From reluctancy to a helm of leadership, America has had to grapple with a largely disinterested
polity, but the global political significance and opportunity that a presence and role in arctic
affairs presents, compiled with the nuance of operating within a periphery environment. The
most notable shift came in the post-90’s salience of climate change for the entire global
community, and the Arctic being a tangible and large-scale example of detrimental ecological
actions and the results. The United States framing of its role in the context of the Arctic
somewhere between economic development and security inclined competitiveness to a conscious
environmental nation shows the flip side of a periphery and liminal environment34. From the
volatility of America’s position on climate preservation to the pursuit of hydrocarbon resources
no matter the environmental costs means that the politicized nature of the issue will force the
country and its actions in the Arctic to change over time. However, with the additional layer of
leadership and power structures within the Arctic and Arctic council, the United States will have
to factor in how its “policy priorities” fit into that framework and the norms of the group
coherency in a periphery environment or risk an international feud with powerful adversaries35.
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Scandinavian Security
Although the Arctic is a periphery territory for even those countries considered to be
insider states sharing some borders with the region, Nordic countries like Finland, Norway, and
Sweden share extremely close and significant regional borders with the Arctic, nestled
proximally to the massive expanse of Russian territory. The consideration of national defense
married with the current and upcoming environmental shifts that climate change will likely bring
out plays an important role for these Nordic countries in defining their place and identity in the
Arctic community. The “investments” in military infrastructure in the Arctic surprisingly come
from these three Nordic nations, and this depicts a fundamental security concern in constructing
Scandinavia’s military capacity in the Arctic space36.
Regarding Russia’s previously mentioned intentions of re-establishing itself as a
“military power at large” in the Arctic, the states that are closest geographically, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden, have become compelled to define their spaces and collective presences by
national security and defense as seen through development and investment in military
infrastructure37. Because the northern border of these three nations is extremely close with the
Arctic thus subject to the geographical changes it is facing through climate change and to any
geopolitical shifts, their reactions to what occurs in this environment can be telling for the rest of
the players in the periphery region. American, Canadian, and even outsider countries such as
China have their own interests and concerns in operating in the Arctic, but Russia’s growth in
arctic troops or flyovers have little direct, visible, and tangible consequence to any nations other
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than the Nordic three38. This demonstrates that the dynamics between Finland, Norway, and
Sweden and Russia can offer insight to the other arctic states, and despite the expansive and
liminal nature of the Arctic, security interests and perceptions are better understood and visible
in periphery zones.
Because a periphery region like the Arctic has shifting and ill-defined borders and
territory markers, Nordic countries rely on self-definition with respect to their actions and
political decisions in the Arctic. Using Norway as a case study, one-third of Norway’s territory
and 80% of its maritime zones are found within its own definition of the Arctic region, the “High
North”39. Additionally, Svalbard, an Archipelago that is part of Norway, hosts the northernmost
populated area and in terms of specific proximity to the Arctic, making Norway the closest of all
near-Arctic states. Although there is no dispute over the ownership of Svalbard, the status of it
within maritime zones and laws have forced Norway to establish an “exclusive economic zone”
in and around the coast of the area, including the islands, the waters, and the continental shelf
below to be Norwegian territory40.
Norway has historically been a strong supporter of multilateralism and cooperative
solutions in foreign policy yet finds itself subject to the fluctuating nature of periphery
environments, forcing it to act outside the norms it usually subscribes to, hence why these
periphery regions are important to observe and offer insight as to how countries might act in selfinterest and candor regarding geopolitical intentions41. Norway’s asymmetric relationship with
Russia and outward affiliation with the U.S. and its European allies as a reaction to its own

38

Ibid, 63.
Andreas Østhagen, “Norway’s Arctic Policy: Still High North, Low Tension?” The Polar
Journal 11, no. 1 (February 2021): p. 77, https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896x.2021.1911043.
40
Ibid, 79.
41
Ibid, 77.
39

25

definition of how its arctic territory occupancy concerns its national security furthers the
necessity of balance in political and policy-making dealings by states to sustain the periphery
benefits in the Arctic.
Security dynamics in the Arctic are difficult not just for states that normally resign
themselves from securitization and militaristic policies, such as these Nordic nations, but
especially because one of the key elements to maintain periphery status is to minimize activities
that garner the attention of main-stage global politics. The Arctic is as vast as it is remote, and its
existence as a periphery territory has resulted in the conceptualization of the region as a
“sheltered…security” zone42. The regionalism in the Arctic with respect to security offers insight
on why states such as Norway and Russia are more concerned with other states’ actions within
the Arctic zone, rather than the securitization of the Arctic itself. The security concerns shrink
with perceived distances, which is likely the reason Russia’s activities are not the tangible threat
to America or Canada that they are to the Nordic countries.
Even despite technological advancements and globalization making distance less
pertinent when it comes to conflict, the physical space of the Arctic and proximal existences is
champion when it comes to state self-definition and action43. This is to say that beyond the lack
of regional boundaries and specific delineations that a state itself proclaims, security in the
Arctic is a construction of each individual state’s self-perception and given physical distances
between arctic insiders. If a region is subject to change with forces like climate change or lacking
clear territorial lines and ownership, the securitization of a region in response or anticipation of
another country’s pursuits to raise the dispute to conflict is a self-interested measure.
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In a periphery region that is out of international political focus and largely undefined by
international constructs, the states reaping the benefits from this dynamic are inclined to operate
with a careful balance self-interest and preservation, yet with respect to making decisions,
especially in attention-grabbing mediums like militarization and conflict, that remain insular and
independent of the territory itself. This connects to the coherency of the Arctic states in
understanding how a periphery region must be maneuvered with precision. The “characterization
of regional order and institutions” so to not formalize or communalize the area beyond what is
necessary, but to foster an Arctic with political coherency for the actors within it is potentially a
means to a “security region” but not a “security community”44. In doing this, nations like
Norway may pursue policies like “High North, low tension” that affords them the necessary
feeling of securitization with respect to their Russian neighbor, while still maintaining and
emblemizing cooperative measures and norms to uphold the Arctic periphery45.

An Arctic Future
In looking at these case studies of the Arctic, a periphery region, and how the nations
existing within the space interact, it is evident that the fluidity and lack of specific structure
fundamentally changes how countries conduct foreign relations in these types of disputed
territories. These key elements missing, such as attention from global powers and legislative
bodies in addition to the normal bureaucratic fixtures of international law, have fostered an
environment where states act in a careful balance of self-interest as well as mutual coherency at
protecting the benefits reaped from such an anarchic region.
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The actions of both outside and inside nations also demonstrates how within these liminal
areas, framing, and the construction of group understandings to keep this careful equilibrium is
extremely important to avoid drawing international attention to a region like the Arctic.
However, with external forces such as climate change and the prospect of future economic
venture, periphery regions like the Arctic can become vulnerable despite this intentional
ambiguity that makes these regions such valuable microcosms of observation on states and their
true geopolitical intentions. The future in the Arctic has promise to become a site of invaluable
resources, territorial expansion, and eventual securitization or militarization for the countries
residing within the disputed territory, but only if those states choose to forgo the current,
temperamental, yet mutually adhered-to norms they have seemingly accepted. This is the
simultaneous benefit and downside for geopolitics within a periphery and liminal area such as
the Arctic; in establishing the few structures to help preserve a space unincumbered by norms,
every state must hold itself accountable, or the entire arrangement could fall apart.
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Maritime Zones
Maritime space and the dynamic between states and their ownership of areas such as
oceans, seas, and any other communal body of water, is something that has risen to relevance
unsurprisingly in tandem with globalization. The 20th century legalization of maritime domain
fundamentally shifted how countries viewed and acted regarding possession and the capacity to
operate and exist within these regions. The conceptualization and construction of boundaries,
states’ rights, and responsibilities regarding oceans and seas is a nuanced practice, as physical or
tangible dividing elements of territory do not exist within the ocean. Thus, it is in the hands of
states and their actors to create agreements or settle disputes in such a liminal environment.
Countries have viewed and engaged in efforts to control maritime space since the 15th
century, the use of the ocean in “exploration, dominance, and industrialization” effectively
transformed the way countries interacted and how our global society took shape46. But the
expansion of legislation in the space in addition to boundary creation, the growth in seaborne
trade, and an explosion in demand, human interactions with maritime zones are increasingly
“intense and complex”47.
Oceans and seas, while expansive and largely uninhabited in the ways that land
traditionally is, are defined by that very intangibility and vagueness in their physical existences.
States are inclined to possess, use, or claim these regions in a similar fashion to land, as the
ownership of territory in any capacity affords security and opportunity.
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The process of “othering” with regard to oceans and seas suggests that countries view
maritime zones as “divided” from the rest of the world and more tangible forms of territory,
creating a different view of unity and geopolitical presence48. Through this construction of the
ocean as possessing an “imaginary nature”, and as a space where power could not be occupied in
permeance as on land, but instead conveyed across, maritime zones and what constitutes the
periphery within them is slightly different with regard to disputed territories49. Using the Spratly
Islands in the South China Sea, and the Black Sea areas of the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov,
this chapter aims to show how the use of specific maritime zones with regard to the construction
of their periphery status is significant in larger state decisions and actions reaching far beyond
the possession of an ocean or a sea and its contents.

Law of the Sea
There are principles and guidelines laid out by global governing bodies, such as the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provide baselines on drawing maritime
boundaries, dividing up territories, and establishing exclusive economic zones and claimable
nautical miles. However, this does not account for how states might “practically” engage with
one another regarding boundary disputes, providing a way to circumvent legal bodies like the
International Court of Justice or the United Nations, and instead find a mutual solution after
bilateral negotiations50.
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International law provides the framework for disputed territory, but determination of
limits and capacity on a contentious subject like geopolitics implies that a more informal and
transaction-based negotiation could be preferable for states given the evolving status of oceans
and seas depending on factors like resources, sanctions, and even climate change. Moreover,
maritime space and territorial disputes are anything but static, and that is only amplified in the
periphery.
The construction of oceans and seas, especially in the periphery, pressures countries to
assess the strategic value of defining ocean territories, particularly given that the concept of
“occupation”, or a stagnant and tangible presence as a state can have on land, does not hold the
same relevance in the “maritime domain”51. This is not to say that maritime law and legislation
of maritime zones is not powerful and a method of constructing to how states view oceans, just
that oceans and seas that exist in the periphery are more aptly and strategically defined by those
who utilize the lack of preexisting legislative guardrails and norms to operate with self-interest in
these specific areas.

Constructing the Water
The lack of agency that maritime spaces are endowed with, mostly due to the
aforementioned absence of physical occupancy in said spaces, places them in the periphery as a
form of territory to begin with. Oceans and seas are constructed as environmental bodies that are
a means to an end, rather than a specific and stagnant piece of land, which would fit a more
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traditional construction of territory52. However, maritime zones have been a medium for the
projection of power, and a platform for states to display their strengths throughout history.
Whether it be in wartime or as a dominant force in global trade, oceans, and seas act as an
environment for states to stage their encounters and disputes, but the vastness and uninhabitable
element prohibits maritime zones from occupying the same central place in international
relations as other forms of territory, unless they are constructed to fulfill that foremost role in
global affairs.
To understand oceans and seas in a constructivist view, it is important to examine how
nations might consider these environments with respect to their given intentions in those spaces.
Maritime zones in this theoretical viewpoint are “socially constituted political spaces”, and how
they are considered by states and given institutions can guide how those actors will “foster
patterns of practices and rules”53. Moreover, these pattens can indicate what states actual
objectives are in utilizing an environment like the ocean, and how they might intend to use that
space for their own personal goals in security, trade, or territorial expansion. The construction of
power enacted within maritime spaces is further amplified by the vagueness of territorial
definitions in certain, periphery ocean spaces. To engage with another state in any capacity
within the maritime arena thus forms a collective building of “political order” created by the
states in a given situation, meaning that no one state can exercise a “determinative control” in an
ill-defined environment54.
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While rules and norms have been established to some degree in documents like the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), maritime spaces are still ruled by
no particular agent or force, instead by association and the group legitimization or
delegitimization of initiatives according to the perception of states’ actions and the
consequences. The liberty of “navigation and freedom” in oceans and seas has enabled great
powers to exert influence in the space, and in utilizing the vastness and adaptableness of
maritime zones to operate politically in ways that more structured forms of disputed territory
would not allow for55. Moreover, the construction of an ocean or a sea will influence how it
might be perceived in terms of centrality or a periphery residence. Should a given region of the
sea be conceptualized with dividing lines in the realm of security, or perceived threats and naval
developments, then that region will occupy a more centralized space of attention in foreign
affairs, regardless of how remote that part of the ocean is with respect to the nations invested in
the conflict56.
By contrast, should a maritime zone be utilized or controlled more advantageously if it
were to be kept out of the global center of attention, the liminality of oceans and seas can be
helpful in circumventing the standing legislation and structures from international law. The
transitionally and shared sovereignty of maritime zones in the periphery can lend itself to the
expansive ways states might choose to construct the ocean for their own interests and pursuits57.

55

Marcelo M Valença and Daniel Elder Duarte, “A Constructivist Approach to Maritime
Spaces,” E-International Relations (E-International Relations, September 11, 2021),
https://www.e-ir.info/2021/09/11/a-constructivist-approach-to-maritime-spaces/.
56
Basil Germond, “The Geopolitical Dimension of Maritime Security,” Marine Policy 54
(2015): pp. 137-142, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.12.013, 139.
57
Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, “Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime
Security Studies,” International Affairs 93, no. 6 (November 2017): pp. 1293-1311,
https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix174, 1303.
33

What makes the periphery regions of the ocean so telling of states truest intentions is the
deconstruction or reconstruction of that seemingly necessary and quintessential cooperative
nature of maritime zones into one that is in actuality, entirely self-interested. In looking at the
Spratly Islands within the South China Sea, this idea of conceiving a maritime zone and all that
is within it in such a way that a seemingly central area has the benefits of periphery status, is
crucial to understanding state intentions and power dynamics for the disputed territory.

Power Vacuum
The South China Sea was at one point, a maritime region that emblemized how a
cooperative viewpoint on a disputed territory can be undermined if the power dynamic shifts
within said agreement. The American exit from the South China Sea and its respective foreign
policy debates and decisions left a gaping hole in the role of a presiding force amongst the Asian
nations that exist in and around the ocean territory.
The reliance on the United States from nations like Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the
Philippines, to have such formidable military might to keep China at bay, fundamentally shifted
how the region was viewed from that point forward. The technical sophistication of the
American military when it was a controlling presence in the region during the 1980’s and 90’s
was one of the main, unspoken, but universally recognized elements to keep a cooperative
existence in the South China Sea, and without it, a massive power vacuum needed to be filled,
and China was eager to do just that58. The new hierarchical arrangement that emerged in the
wake of the United States leaving the region, and the political conflict that has unfolded since
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then, is precisely what is prompting the more recent and less attended to territorial dispute
playing out in the South China Sea: the Spratly Islands.

Ill-Defined Islands
Although the South China Sea is seemingly not a periphery territory, especially
considering the central role within global politics that the region has risen to, and the attention
from the international community at large it has received in more recent years. It is instead the
varied oceanic geographical features, including but not limited to islands, reefs, cays, atolls,
shoals, sand banks, and man-made islands, that are less discussed. This constructed periphery,
that indicates remoteness in terms of lack of international attention, fits the disputed territory of
the Spratly Islands. These islands and the entirety of the South China Sea have immense power
attached to a hypothetical ownership of the maritime zone by one nation. Whether it be the
amount of shipping traffic that flows through the region, or the plentiful natural gas and 11
billion barrels of oil reserves, seizing control in any capacity would give a country both territorial
and economic prowess that would subjugate all other nations in the area to this state.
The utility of these islands is varied, but not to be underestimated. The oil and gas
deposits and maritime territorial control are obvious, but other elements that again, reside on the
periphery of international attention, are pivotal. The military and securitization of the region and
any land or oceanic masses would give fortified control to a country like China over its
neighboring countries, who have since been building up their own militaries in response59. The
militarization of these islands is not something that necessarily needs to take form in warships
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and landing strips, although it may eventually escalate to that point. The simple claim of
ownership over a disputed territory provides enough material for a state seeking power to get
started on securitizing the area. Essentially, in order for a country to establish sovereignty over
an island, that nation must establish “title” to the islands, and except in the case of “inhospitable
territory”, must protect that title through use60.
A hegemony of Chinese control in the region would come at a great cost to the
neighboring nations, and that paradigm shift of power depends on the construction and definition
of the sea itself, and the numerous small land masses within. At the same time, the theme of
cooperative control or shared use of a given disputed territory is a powerful measure that can
allow states to utilize a space with respect to one another, while still letting it remain ill-defined.
Should other countries in the region choose to work together in any number of ways to curb
China’s takeover and continue to construct the region by their own definitions, that may
challenge Beijing’s sweeping efforts at complete ownership of the sea and everything within it.

All for One or One for All
The vested interest in maintaining the South China Sea, and specifically, the Spratly
archipelagos as a disputed territory lies with every country except for China in the region. The
time of affording this valuable environment a contested and disputed title evaporated the moment
that China began laying claim to the sea and its contents. This destroyed the cooperative
existence of all the states with regard to the maritime zone that existed previously. It also forced
the countries to either advocate for their own rightful possession, sovereignty, and logical basis
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for their ownership, for the sake of their own security, or allow China to take charge with a
potential promise that military repercussions might not befall them due to their compliance.
The nature of these island-specific disputes within the sea is beneficial to keep on the
international discourse periphery because it has the capacity to draw American attention with the
militarization of the region. Thus, it could be strategic of the states wanting to claim ownership
of any of the islands to raise this debate to a global stage and involve international legislative
bodies so to disrupt China’s forward movement.
One of the key elements of claiming territory is the notion of history. Vietnam as an
example has over 500 years of chronicled history in the South China Sea, detailing the state’s
dealings and ownership of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, all maintained through books,
maps, and documents from their records and those of other nations, including China61. The idea
of “continuity of sovereignty” for Vietnam over these islands is something frequently expressed
in justifying the state’s rightfulness to claim the territory as theirs and connects to the importance
of construction when defining sovereignty within disputed territory62.
The Philippines have taken the position of geographic proximity legitimizing their
ownership, with the Kalayaan group of islands falling within the 200m Exclusive Economic
Zone, rendering nine features of the Spratly archipelago to be Philippine territory under Articles
55-75 of the UNCLOS63. The utilization of the legal framework that does exist surrounding
oceanic territories is another means of bolstering ownership and takes the tactic of pushing a
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periphery region to the global center stage by involving a legal body. Malaysia has followed a
similar path, instead demonstrating the country’s continental shelf and EEZ extending into the
southernmost part of the Spratly Island area, given Articles 76-85 of UNCLOS, positions the
areas under Malaysian possession by law. The blend of geographic and legal constructions to aid
in legitimizing claims to disputed territories affords nations such as the Philippines and Malaysia
a safeguard in the global purview due to the concrete interpretations of those assertions.
Taiwan approaches this situation differently, likely due to the pre-existing tumultuous
relationship with China. Although the Taiwanese government has “repeatedly” declared that the
islands within the South China Sea are part of its territory and the country will take “decisive
action” to “improve” the nation’s maritime rights, it advocates for “multilateral negotiations”
amongst the countries disputing the islands and maritime zone64. This proposal of “setting aside
differences” and “enhancing development cooperation” as a means of negotiating to achieve a
solution within peaceful and safe parameters for the region does not have the same realismoriented perspective that other neighboring countries maintain in such a burgeoning conflictual
situation65.
The dynamic between China and Taiwan cannot be disregarded in influencing Taiwan’s
perspective so distinctly absent of a sovereignty driven intent, but the connection to the
cooperative outlook on the sea and its islands that once was, is noteworthy due to its efficacy in
recent history. Taiwan’s take on the Spratly Islands echoes of pragmatism and diplomacy that
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defy the typical routes taken regarding disputed territory, however, this is the periphery66. This
liminal environment prompts states to instead provide a solution that has promise to maintain the
utility for all nations, but requires a careful and mutual defining of the disputed maritime zone
and all its geographic contents.

Out of the Periphery
Due to the growing tension surrounding ownership of the Spratly Islands, it is unlikely
that the maritime territories will be feasibly in the global periphery for much longer. The growth
in China’s presence in the South China Sea as well as its assertion of ownership compiled with
its Naval power fosters a hostile environment for the states and actors vying for claim. The
recent calls for American intervention or presence in the region as a combatant force against
China has created an increase in international attention on the issue, notably when the US State
Department issued a report declaring one of the core elements to China’s claim of ownership,
“historical rights” to be “meaningless”67.
The rejection of a historical construction in claiming territory asserts that legal structures
are the most defining tool used when settling territorial disputes in the center of world political
affairs. Moreover, China’s creation of new land within the Spratly Islands through dredging and
artificial island building was also cited in the report, which stressed that any defining of the
maritime zone’s legal status must be assessed based on “natural state”68.
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In moving the Spratly Island debate out of the periphery and into the mainstream
discussion that includes the waters that houses the islands, the South China Sea, it is evident that
the valuable ability for states to construct the legitimacy of their claim of ownership and
possession outside of legal structures will be eroded. The international community calling for the
US to weigh in on the dispute harkens to the time in history when an American presence did
exist in the maritime zone and aided in keeping any disputes at bay. While this shift may reduce
the flexibility of the states to define or assert their ownership given the confines of international
law, oceans and seas remain bodies of territory that are challenging to define.
The breakdown of a cooperative nature in the South China Sea regarding the Spratly
Islands surely pushed the debate out of the periphery but leaves the numerous arguments
extending from the concerned countries in the area about their respective claims for ownership.
Moreover, the power of the periphery is the ability for states to act with self-interest, even
undiplomatically, because of the lack of attention from international bodies that might require
certain norms to be followed.
China made a gamble to an extent in trying to take-over the Spratly Islands in a drawnout show of force and will not have to adhere to the structures at the center of international
affairs. This was an instance of the deconstruction of cooperatively disputed periphery territory.
The alternative example, guising a self-interested foreign policy agenda as a reconstruction of
periphery territory within a communal space, is what encompasses Russia’s intentions in the
Black Sea region.
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Beyond the Black Sea
Maritime zones can host a plethora of valuable attributes, from trading ports to
geographic security provisions and energy resources to transportation. A region containing all
these attributes, like the Black Sea, is incredibly important to all those who operate in and around
it, as well as those who depend on the maritime zone and what it provides. However, periphery
zones within this area stay mainly below the EU’s radar, despite the much larger implications
should any states that use this sea decide to forcibly take control of the many ports or shift points
of border delineations.
The Black Sea serves as an “important junction” between Europe and Asia, and as both
continents “interconnect more closely” for trade and economic purposes, the territory has
become increasingly contentious for the powerful nations residing in the region who may want to
control it69. Russia’s construction of the Black Sea is one built off of “centuriesold…confrontation” with Europe and a “geopolitical rivalry”70. In today’s context, the Black Sea
is a point of territorial control and strategy for Russia. As an international water bordered by
countries like Georgia, Turkey, and Ukraine, the maritime zone is integral to the “geoeconomics
strategy” or emboldening and projecting of Russian power and influence beyond Eastern Europe
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and into the EU. This is a means of forcing Europe to rely on Russian resources, while
maintaining a security buffer from the volatility in the South Caucus region71.
The Black Sea and any conflicts that emerge within it are hard to conceal from the center
stage of geopolitics and international affairs. As such a central connecting body of water between
the East and the West, any military movement or power-grabs will face international legal bodies
such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council and the EU established Black Sea Synergy
Initiative, which outlines a comprehensive guide to cooperation between nations operating within
the area; there is little margin for dispute. However, maritime zones in and around the Black Sea,
such as the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait, have maintained a periphery position in the global
political discourse, despite their significance in demonstrating the Russian geopolitical agenda.

Azov Aspirations
Russia’s outlook post-2014 invasion of Crimea left the state hungry for regional
dominance in and around the Black Sea basin. With extensive military and economic resources
placed behind the intention to establish a new power order, “defined and enforced by Russia”, a
motivation for securing control on interstate relationships through territorial authority was
evident.72 The land grab in the Crimea invasion was a significant step for this agenda because it
effectively tripled the length of Black Sea coastline that Russia had, and with regard to the
claiming of offshore continental shelves or exclusive economic zones, states must possess
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adjacent land territory or coastline. In this pursuit, Russia’s power grew extensively in a way that
was overlooked compared to the conflict occurring in the midst of the Crimean takeover. This
territorial expansion stretched Russia’s presence in the Azov Sea region specifically, leaving
only Ukraine and Russia holding borders over the crucial maritime zone; Ukraine with a loss of
control on their maritime territory of around 100,000 square kilometers, and Russia with coastal
state jurisdiction of the maritime space to a degree it had not had before73.
It is important to clarify that the Sea of Azov has a different legal status than that of the
Black Sea despite the close proximity and shared space. The only two agreements regarding the
area were made in the early 2000’s, and left the question of delimitation for future discussions,
only establishing that the area should be regarded as “historically internal waters of Russia and
Ukraine” or “shared internal waters” with no specific mention of ownership74. This left the sea as
both disputed and, on the periphery, with no legal parameters guiding the liminal dynamic
between the now territory-heavy Russia and the at-risk Ukraine.
Russia’s pursuits in claiming this territory are multifaceted. Regarding economic and
security dynamics, as well as a construction of capturing the power in the region to control the
neighboring states, their pursuits exemplify a territorial dispute rooted in preventing nations such
as Ukraine from attempting to join the EU and instead expanding Russian control to the west. By
using successful takeovers of disputed territory as a vehicle for building regional power guised
by reconstructing a semblance of territorial commonality in a region, Russia can foster such a
reach without attracting too much global attention that would prompt western states to form an
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anticipatory defense against the gradual undermining of territorial integrity. With the focus of
Russia’s security intentions on ensuring Russian dominance over “regional adversaries, above
all, Ukraine” and “reducing the ability of outside actors” to challenge their position, this layered
power projection through contested maritime zones around the Black Sea have been sites of
significant progress in reshaping “previously established regional security arrangements” via
disputed territorial expansion in this periphery zone75.

Seeing the Kerch Strait
The Kerch Strait is a strait that connects the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, a small area
between Russian occupied Crimea and Russia, but under the above-mentioned 2003 bilateral
treaty, a waterway that is open to use by both Russia and Ukraine. In 2018, Russian patrol boats
from the country’s coast guard fired on Ukrainian navy warships near the entrance of the Kerch
Strait, and the interaction resulted in the seizure of the Ukrainian ships and arrest of 24 naval
personnel by Russia76. From this event, the dispute regarding ownership and freedom of
movement in the region reignited, as well as the construction of the justification for armed
conflicts given the laws and norms of disputed or ill-defined maritime zones in the periphery.
While Russia’s actions against Ukraine did prompt condemnation from the international
community over their imprisonment of the Ukrainian sailors and the overall perception of
unwarranted military aggression toward the situation, there remains the question of Russia’s
purpose for such an outright military action77. What happened in 2018 was not an entirely
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isolated incident, Russia had been delaying, harassing, and targeting Ukrainian ships bound to or
from Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov, and continues to do so in the present day.
This specific incident was distinct because of the global attention it garnered, and the
reaction from Russia in justifying their actions. Whether it was a show of force to construct the
territory as their own, and position Ukraine as the invasive party, or to manifest the communalist
role of a protector against those trying to disrupt territorial lines, it demonstrated a shift in
Russia’s self-definition with respect to the maritime zone. Because this body of water loomed
largely on the periphery due to its importance to just two countries, the position and role as a
gateway to the Sea of Azov, and thus to the Black Sea, is pivotal to Russia’s expansion of control
throughout the region.

Manufacturing Conflict
Russia was widely criticized for violating Ukraine’s “right to freedom of navigation” as
well as the “sovereign immunity” of the seized naval vessels, which were warships, but
according to Article 32 of UNCLOS, no other state may exercise legal competence over them,
thus the seizure is “unlawful”78. However, the ill-defined and liminal nature of the Kerch Strait
due to its position on the periphery has left it in one view, a Ukrainian territorial sea under
Russian occupation, but in another, a shared space, or alternatively, a majority Russian territorial
sea since its capture of Crimea, now enduring a Ukrainian occupation. The importance of a
periphery status in aiding this lack of defining legal parameters is integral in situations like these
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when a decade beyond the UN’s soon-to-be established specifications regarding the geopolitical
legislation for the region is now affording periphery actions and status that could lead to nearwar escalations.
To exemplify, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement after the
incident that condemned Russia as violating the Law of Armed conflict. Citing the 1974
Definition of Aggression as written by the UN General Assembly, Ukraine essentially stated that
Russia had no right nor justification to act with military aggression and should face
consequences for its actions79. However, the “applicability” of the Law of Armed Conflicts
regarding this event is “conditional upon the existence of an armed conflict” between the two
nations at the time of the incident80.
Thus, the nature of this encounter would be over what is supposed to be a shared body of
water, according to what little defining legislative measures exist for the Kerch Strait. While
Ukraine got the symbolic victory of bringing Russia’s actions to the center stage of international
politics and ensured that the Ukrainian soldiers that were captured were eventually released,
there were no actual charges made against Russia, nor changes made to the undefined status of
the Kerch Strait in international law, meaning that Russia continued to infringe on Ukrainian
navigational, coastal, and transportation space and rights in the region81. Even within the Strait,
Russia has continuously used the measure of distance in the disputed but shared territory to cite
justification for military measures, threatening to consider any Ukrainian movement an attack at
seemingly random distances from Russian-captured Crimean borders and declaring various areas
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within the region to be closed at their discretion. All this amounts to a certain “psychological
pressure…maybe preparation for a possible war landing on the shore” with the benefit of
periphery liminality not requiring Russia to answer for any of their actions in the context of the
maritime dispute82.
So long as Russia continues to do everything but step foot on Ukrainian territory, the
periphery status of important maritime regions such as the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov
affords states the ability to act in self-interest, concealed as a by-product of the pre-existing lack
of clarity surrounding territorial possession that is synonymous with oceans and seas. Russia’s
utilization of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait is strategic to build up military presence and
power within the confines of disputed or undefined territory, and in doing so will have resources
to make substantial impact in the larger, profitable, and important maritime zones that are not in
the periphery: the Black Sea.
By using these tactical, periphery waterways, a state with vested military interest in
expanding power has a means to expand their reach and still portray their actions as “legitimate
and justified” responses to “external security threats” by their own definitions in the absence of
other, more concrete legal constructs83. The overall implications of the securitization of these
maritime zones, economic, social, political, marks a revisionist and assertive policy for Russia in
the region, one that branched from the capture of Crimea to the weakening of Ukraine, all
through the vehicle of disputed and periphery ocean territories.
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Wading Ahead
The complexity of maritime zones lies in the multilayered construction of how
geographical bodies such as oceans and seas fit into territorial disputes. The dynamic between a
nation and its perceived territory is often defined by how a country and its people might exist on
such a space, how they might occupy it, or indicate some kind of ownership in a tangible
manner. As established, periphery regions show the true intentions of states, and this theory
holds in the examination of larger, more central bodies of water, and the smaller, periphery areas
within them.
The construction of the periphery in this sense is not necessarily the distance, or
proximity to a more interior area of geopolitical disputes, but periphery by a lack of global
attention, and minimal or ill-defined legislative parameters to define the region. The South China
Sea and the Black Sea are both well-known regions of the world, surrounded by nations and
actors that have long captured international attention, but the periphery nature of the disputes
covered in this chapter shows that even within a seemingly predominant area of international
political discourse over territory, there are smaller but more revealing disputes occurring.
In looking at the selective, specific, and tactical actions taken by states in these regions, it
is evident what future actions might be taken in the center stage of global territorial disputes, the
larger more prominent bodies of water that the Spratly Islands, the Sea of Azov, and the Kerch
Strait reside within. By taking these less observed and underregulated periphery areas into
account when assessing the future geopolitical aspirations, a clearer indication of a state’s
intentions may be revealed, and more effective foreign policy can be made. The reduction of
conflict that may be provided by more clarity in these areas so to minimize the escalation into a
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securitized or militarized territorial dispute could help prevent unnecessary inequities in the
global community with respect to disputed territory.
The construction of how states act in oceans has a certain flexibility that does not exist in
other territorial disputes due to the way oceans and seas exist. The lack of permeance, the
inability to inhabit, and the essentiality of these environments makes maritime zones a
quintessential geological body for contention. At the same time, the necessity for a cooperative
international utilization of oceans seas because of the communal existence fosters a commonality
or vested interest in preserving these waterways in a vague legislative status that permits freer
actions for all states involved; that is, until one state strives for more individual power and
control, undermining the communal dynamic and forcing dispute.
The utility of oceans and seas goes beyond just territorial possession. Maritime zones like
any other geographic zone, and the dispute, is an extension of state strength. The claim to an
ocean, a sea, a strait, or any other body of water is a means of establishing a boundary on an
otherwise intangible space, something only a formidable global power can achieve.

Afterword
This chapter was finished on February 21st of 2022, around 48 hours before Vladimir
Putin launched an invasion into Ukraine. When researching some of the key maritime zones I felt
substantiated my argument and were of interest to me in the weeks prior to the war breaking out,
I remember seeing a marginal influx in reports about the region, not specifically regarding the
Sea of Azov or the Kerch Strait, but general coverage about the Black Sea and speculative utility,
thus precedence for a Russian invasion. Hence, the sections in this chapter that cover both these
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territories was written in a hypothetical sense, despite the eventual and now current reality of the
Russian military effort in both these zones.
Both the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait are far less peripheral than they were when I
completed my draft of this chapter, but most coverage regarding their insurmountable strategic
importance to both Ukraine and Russia still analyzes the contested territories in terms of the land
near it, cities like Mariupol. This is not to say that the war occurring in Ukrainian cities is not
vitally important to understanding this conflict and the disputed territory element of it all, it just
demonstrates how land, or territorial formations that are more tangibly conceived, continue to
stay at the focal point of the international discourse. Maritime zones, despite their proximal
location in this situation, still seemingly remain more challenging to feasibly construct, thus stay
on the periphery of international discourse surrounding this war. This can surely change as new
developments in this conflict unfold each day, but I felt it was important to note the time and
context in which this chapter was written with respect to the continuing conflict between Russia
and Ukraine.
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Land
Territorial conflicts are most feasibly and frequently conceptualized as land-based
occurrences. After all, humanity and society exist almost entirely on land, thus centers of
populous are likely to have the most clearly defined rules and norms when it comes to
understanding and addressing geopolitical disputes over issues including but not limited to
boundaries, resources, or politics. It is difficult for a land-based territorial dispute to stay on the
periphery of international attention and discourse to the extent that certain maritime zones or the
Arctic might, and much of that connects to that population element. The tangibility and
importance of a disputed territory is far more pressing and graspable if we are able to see the
immediacy of it; human lives are at risk in a war over a border, the sociocultural significance of
history in a given conflict, contention over valuable natural resources or industries.
Land based territory is an effective provider of security, opportunity, self-sufficiency,
protection, and preservation of the state, its people, and an identity84. With the disruption of a
perceived rightful ownership to land by a state or state actors, a dispute can escalate to a focal
point in the global discourse that garners international attention very quickly. In the same vein,
territorial disputes on land can manifest into state-defining conflicts; these conflicts can last for
such an extended amount of time that countries adopt an orientation or “attain a sense of
belonging” with the cause of defending or fighting for a given space85. These “never-resolved”
disputes might originate from states seeking to “delimit” the “precise boundary between national
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territories”, to intentionally muddle a given boundary as a means of one day potentially using
that ill-defined environment to take back what is seen as rightful land86.
This lack of resolution or at least the failure to reach a conclusive agreement on a landbased territorial dispute is also a means of existing in the periphery, and a frequent reason behind
this inability to reach settlement is the long-term ramifications that colonialism had on state
geopolitical construction. Even after achieving independence, postcolonial states must still
contend with the deconstruction and reconstruction of their countries, identities, and selfdefinition, as their neighboring states do the same. Boundaries and treaties created during
colonial rule are considered “binding” on postcolonial successor states, regardless of if the
colonized people had a voice in determining those borders or not87.
The reason this becomes a periphery dispute is because until there is an incentivizing
reason for the powerful, often former colonialist states to be interested in these territorial
conflicts, usually economic opportunity or the global community intervening on a dispute turned
violent or warring, it is of little interest given the sheer amount of land-based disputed territories
existing already. Moreover, territorial disputes on land are literally closer to home, thus countries
must look at geopolitical discourse impacting them directly first. Without the attention of the
larger and more powerful countries, many of the postcolonial states who are still suffering the
decisions made amidst colonialism on their behalf, remain on the periphery of international
discourse. In this chapter, the ongoing disputes of Venezuela and Guyana, as well as Morocco’s
claim over the Western Sahara region will serve to exemplify the dynamic of geopolitical
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conflict as an aftershock of colonialism, and how that constructs the periphery for land-based
territorial contention.

Postcolonial Presence
Territory can offer the provision of community and combined with a specific identity, can
help construct how a state sees itself and in turn how the world might view the state. Colonialism
disrupted any and all that existed prior, and shaped what was left after, especially concerning
how state borders existed. Because of this, some postcolonial countries remain with a strenuous
back-and-forth between “unification and fragmentation” of territory, fragmentation being an
“accepted” existence of the past that could have been culturally or sociologically amended
amidst achieving liberation, creating unification88. However, fragmentation still exists within
disputed territories, as colonialism constructed territory as a commodity irrespective of history,
culture, and identity, and uncaring about the ramifications of dividing land up to serve colonialist
and imperialist economic benefit89.
Colonialism put an emphasis on boundaries and formulated a value to what existed
within a given territory. Whether that was the land and its position in the world, the people of a
territory, or the resources within a given environment, the construction of borders as a provision
of power did not dissipate for postcolonial states even with the end of colonialism.
The colonialist focus on land as something to be conceived in just “material aspects”,
completely negating or at least hindering the “very identity of the state and the nation” only
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served to exacerbate postcolonial conflict over disputed territory because it created this emphasis
on the notion of possession and geographical expression to define a state, rather than social
aspects like culture and shared history90. In doing this, postcolonial states are left with a new
focal point on reshaping their individuality: the pursuit of rediscovering identity through
rectifying territory and boundaries lost during colonialism or defending what they might have
acquired during the colonialist era, frequently to and from a neighboring country. This in turn
can spark conflicts between these states despite neither being the actual aggressor.
Disputed territories and their construction are not static throughout history. With the
strategic and economic value of land being placed at the center of colonialism’s redefinition of
territorial utility and worth, and the significance of borders, conflict was expectable for
postcolonial states in their pursuit for self-definition amidst the everlasting establishments of
colonialism.

Theoretical Terrain
While land based territorial disputes are the most commonly mapped, covered, and
researched, with the majority of extensive legal guardrails in comparison to other forms of
disputed territory, there still exists the complexity of why states feel so compelled to fight over
territory that outwardly, may not seem worth fighting for. Disputes over territory, especially in
rebuilding and reconstructing state identity post-colonialism trigger a sense of “injustice” within

90

Tuomas Forsberg, “Explaining Territorial Disputes: From Power Politics to Normative
Reasons,” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 4 (November 1996): pp. 433-449,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343396033004005, 438.
54

international affairs91. In looking at land disputes through the lens of normative theory, territorial
disputes can carry the weight of restoring land unfairly lost, and border disputes in specific are
rooted in history, reminiscent of violence, and long-withstanding92.
To construct land as simply where the state resides is narrow and incomplete, as disputed
territory remains disputed if viewed as a zero-sum game without any other reason for conflict
than the material aspects of a border or a territory93. The human history that has existed on land,
both ancient and recent, constructs land-based disputed territory as a byproduct of both
normative and emotional connections by people to the land. Moreover, as the case studies in this
chapter are also characterized by their periphery status, it is not the distance of the disputed
territories from a specific global core, rather the remaining colonialist impacts on these areas that
global powers complicit or responsible for those atrocities seek to distance themselves from, or
simply are uninterested in aiding in remedying the divisions they left behind. The only caveat to
this, which emphasizes the liminality of a periphery residence, is the reconstruction of these
otherwise historical, emotional, and normative perceptions and drivers of disputed territories,
into opportunities for economic or political power for both the countries involved in the dispute,
and outside actors.
The dynamic between former colonial and postcolonial states within the liminal
environment of periphery disputed territory is significant. While powerful or larger countries
who at one point colonized the states involved in the disputed territory may use this periphery
status to achieve their own economic or political goals, the postcolonial states and the actual root
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cause of the dispute are frequently left out of any resolution or benefit. In this way, the periphery
provides a measure of convenience and strategy to the states who are not directly involved in the
disputed territory, and the distinct lack of structure and legal bindings for the states concerned
over the disputed territory leaves the conflict continuously unsolved despite scale and adeptness
of the outside nations involved. From this, the periphery status of disputed territories through the
lens of a postcolonial theory demonstrates an added layer in how states may engage differently in
a liminal environment, but notably regarding land-based and peripheral disputed territories.

Guyana, Venezuela, and the Essequibo
The disputed territory between Guyana and Venezuela, the Essequibo, is one that has its
roots in history, and colonialism. During the era of Spanish occupation in Venezuela and British
imperialism in Guyana, formerly British Guiana, this Essequibo region went through numerous
rounds of debate in the 19th century during the consolidation and reorganization of colonial
powers and their presences in South America. The area was eventually divided and awarded,
leaving Guyana with the densely forested land between the Orinoco and Essequibo rivers in the
basin, accounting for two thirds of the country’s present-day territory and rendering it Guyanese
national territory, and Venezuela retained the Orinoco River basin.
As Venezuela achieved independence before the former British Guiana and the colonial
countries waned their presences globally, there were essentially no disputes on the borders and
ownership of this area for nearly six decades. However, following Guyana’s independence,
Venezuela rescinded their approval of the 1899 territorial ruling due to its conception by
colonialist actors rather than the concerned states. This was followed by several years of
disputing the Port of Spain Protocol in 1970 which placed a moratorium on the original dispute
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that lasted until 1982, and was continued when the states could not reach agreement, even though
the International Court of Justice, where the case still sits unaddressed94.
The intentional inability to define the region for the sake of curbing conflict helped to
push the disputed territory into the periphery of the global political conversation. While Guyana
was awarded this territory at the end of the colonialist presence and era in the region,
Venezuela’s attestation that the Essequibo territory was taken from them by colonialists in the
first place demonstrates the fluidity of territory that previously went undefined or was viewed as
a pre-colonial shared region between countries, constructed under colonialism, and then
distributed arbitrarily without concern for what that might do to the states involved after the
fact95.

Emulsion
Leaving a disputed territory in ambiguity was never a sustainable solution for Venezuela
and Guyana regarding the Essequibo. The proximity of the regional dispute and the accessibility
of land regarding resource extraction, occupation, or even just geopolitical power was too
feasible for states not to capitalize on such an undefined environment. The liminality of the
Essequibo benefitted Guyana much more than it did Venezuela as time went on due to the
impending entrance of foreign private actors who would utilize this region for their own benefit.
A periphery status is only sustainable if all states involved are reaping some sort of benefit from
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the situation, thus prompting them to maintain some sort of communality, but with the start of oil
exploration by the Guyanese and the financial promise that came with the venture, Venezuela
began to raise opposition once again.
The discovery of oil fields by ExxonMobil in the Essequibo amongst the pre-existing
natural resources of the region catapulted Guyana into the ranks of the world’s top energy
markets in the early 2010’s96. With that economic attention, Venezuelan leadership began to call
upon its own foreign alliances, namely Russia, to potentially send troops or nuclear weapons to
engage with Guyana over these newfound resources97. Venezuela’s president “vowed to
reconquer” the Essequibo, promising to establish military presences both on the coast and within
the Essequibo to prevent any oil from leaving the region and force their claim on the area98. With
all of this military posturing over natural assets, the strategic gain of a new oil reserve seemed to
be the catalyst for pushing this conflict into the center of global discourse and would thus solve
the dispute over the territory by pressure of international bodies.
The promise of oil and economic gain is enough to force a territorial dispute out of the
periphery, but in the case of this disputed territory, the countries involved still largely remain in
this liminal space. Guyana reaped the benefits of a post-colonial boundary designation, and
Venezuela spent the years following attempting to contest this allocation, but the actual heart of

96

Paul J. Angelo and Wazim Mowla, “Another Conflict Is Brewing in the Caribbean,” Foreign
Policy, March 22, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/22/venezuela-guyana-essequibomaduro-opposition-oil/?tpcc=recirc_trending062921.
97
Ibid.
98
Canute James, “Venezuela Saber-Rattles over Guyana, US Wades in: Argus Media,”
Commodity & Energy Price Benchmarks (Argus Media, January 11, 2021),
https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2175764-venezuela-saberrattles-over-guyana-us-wadesin.

58

the dispute is the construction of land-based territory as a point of geopolitical gain through its
value, rather than an actual internal and normative claim to the land.

Rebuild All Your Ruins
Colonialism took land such as the Essequibo, which was previously shared between
several countries in the region as a natural wetland and river basin, and created something to
fight over given the newly constructed lens that land was henceforth viewed in. Prior to the
entrance of outside states and non-state actors, the disagreement between Venezuela and Guyana
likely maintained a periphery status because it was seen as a territorial dispute between two
nations over delineations, as the byproducts of colonial-era allocations were largely arbitrary, or
simply reflected which colonial powers occupied the space the longest. Thus, it was
sociocultural, something held between the two countries, and not of interest to the global
discourse despite so many powerful nations being complicit in creating the disputed territory.
This dispute over the Essequibo and the borders between Venezuela and Guyana was
reignited and brought out of the periphery to some degree because of the Guyanese oil efforts.
The internal conflict of Venezuela’s political problems in addition to the framing of territory as a
construction of value and power rather than a normative environment also played a sizable role
in fostering the dispute99. In all instances where the UN stepped in to appease the disagreement
of the two nations over the region, the little traction it may have had in reparative discourse fell
to the wayside. The only aspect of the Essequibo that existed outside the periphery was the
financial gain for oil companies that the region might bring, not the extensive history and
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collateral damage from colonialism that embedded a self-defeating viewpoint on land possession
for these nations
The territorial controversy involving the Essequibo has the capacity to turn into a
detrimental conflict with a driven and corrupt leader like Maduro pushing for militarization,
backed by Russia, and viewing this disputed territory as a point of political power100. The
Caribbean countries’ support of Guyana as well as China’s close relationship with both
Venezuela and Guyana complicates the matter further. Even though this territory has the
makings of a global conflict, the heart of it, the root cause of the debate over the Essequibo
between Guyana and Venezuela, would still remain in the periphery. The countries’ claim to this
land lies in the long term impacts colonial era mappings of a once communal region of nature,
the reconstruction of an identity, and a provision of territory that previously belonged to no one.
The global core does not have any incentive to address such a historical and complex issue, but it
will contend with the potential for strategic and economic gain to be had in the oil reserves, and a
South American political presence overseeing the disputed territory.
The Essequibo as an area exemplifies colonialism’s impact on the construction of
territory for postcolonial states, as well as the liminality of the periphery when powerful states
pick and choose what parts of a disputed territory get elevated to global prominence. Guyana and
Venezuela are left with the disputed Essequibo, and a “volatile” reality emerges for the two
states, exacerbated by the commoditization of the land and its resources101. In this way, the
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periphery dynamic demonstrates how powerful states use liminality to their benefit for their own
biddings, while leaving the smaller and less powerful nations in a purgatory over their disputed
territory. The only way to remedy this situation is to hear the Guyanese and Venezuelan
perspective, comprehend the role of history, and work to untangle the colonial and cultural clash
of conceptualizing what land-based territory is.

Western Sahara
The twentieth century era of decolonization was a time of huge shifts in territorial
conceptions, geopolitical presence and power, postcolonial countries understanding their position
in the global community, and the newfound sense of state with the remaining colonially defined
borders as the last semblance of structure. Western Sahara was the final region to be decolonized
when Spain left in 1976, leaving Morocco and Mauritania in administrative but not sovereign
control due to their annexed areas within Western Sahara102. The rising force within Western
Sahara keen on establishing statehood and sovereignty was the Polisario Front, which was
backed by neighboring Algeria and had been growing in power since prior to the decolonization.
In the years that followed, the UN dispatched a mission to establish how Western Sahara might
exist in the postcolonial world, and it reached the conclusion that the Sahrawi people and the
Polisario Front had stronger support for Western Saharan independence than other options such
as integration of the various annexed areas or continued Spanish rule. However, this was not a
decisive decision for Western Saharan sovereignty.
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Despite Western Sahara’s push for legitimacy, the remnants of colonialism left a complex
web of various claims on the territory. Remaining anti-Spanish groups who lived in the “Spanish
Sahara” portion of the region wanted not independence, but to join Morocco, a state that had
already expressed interest in absorbing Western Sahara which at this point in the late 1970s was
still without statehood103. The International Court of Justice thus got involved and concluded that
despite “historical links” with Mauritania and Morocco, there was not enough evidence to prove
sovereignty of either state over Western Sahara but failed to award the disputed a resounding
statehood or global legitimacy due to the continued regional discrepancy104.
From that point forward, Morocco and Western Sahara have been engaged in some form
of dispute over territory and sovereignty, including the Western Sahara War which lasted nearly
16 years and despite the call for ceasefire, failed to formulate any kind of permanent solution.
Since 1991, Morocco and Western Sahara have continued to have hostile engagements and
dispute the territory, despite several more United Nations ventures, such as the Mission for
Referendum in Western Sahara, and UN peace negotiations known as the Houston Agreement as
well as the Baker Plans I and II, all of which failed as each were rejected by the Polisario or
Morocco105.
This historical context is important in better understanding why Western Sahara remains
a disputed territory today, despite such a lengthy background in pursuit of self-determination, as
well as the neighboring nations’, specifically Morocco’s, perseverance in claiming the land as its
own. The postcolonial path to statehood is never a straightforward venture, and despite the
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efforts of large, global legislative bodies such as the UN, no solution arrives easily. Western
Sahara falls into the periphery in the same fashion that the Essequibo does; it was given
geopolitical value during colonialism, rather than the symbolic, cultural, and preexisting
normative views on territory and land, and thus is trapped in a cycle of dispute and redefinition
in a postcolonial world.
The countries impacted by colonialism are left to find their sense of statehood and
identity in an arbitrary and liminal environment left behind by colonialist nations. These large
colonialist powers in turn will continue to exacerbate the problem in continuing to define the
land by its value to their political and economic goals. After several tries from bodies like the
UN, countries from the global core fail to enact any meaningful or impartial assistance in the
disputed territory of Western Sahara, resigning the violence, humanitarian crisis, and neverending conflict aspect of this to the periphery.

Chessboard Made of Sand
Western Sahara as a disputed territory exists in two different ways. The first is the most
evident, yet resides in the periphery, and is essentially the fight from the Polisario front in
establishing Western Saharan statehood, intending on creating a country for the Sahrawi people
to have. Then there is the dispute which the territory is being used for, one of many regional
feuds in the Maghreb that is being played out in the Western Saharan area between Algeria and
Morocco. Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara lies in history but is bolstered by fear that a
Sahrawi independence could “destabilize” Moroccan monarchy and cause a power shift in
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Northern Africa not in Morocco’s favor106. Algeria has in turn been incredibly supportive of the
Polisario, providing funding and weapons as well as vocal support on Western Saharan
independence, yet ensuring that the Sahrawi cause fails to go beyond characterizing Morocco as
an oppressor in the situation107.
Using this Western Saharan territory as leverage for their own state discord has left the
true plight of the territory and its pursuit of independence largely unheard in the situation as a
whole, because in actuality, prior to colonialism the Sahrawi people were nomads “with little
sense of nationalism or national borders”, thus the idea of “self-determination” within the
confines of statehood and borders is a byproduct of colonial constructions of territory and
identity108.
Morocco’s policy regarding Western Sahara has even gone as far as giving “preferential
treatment” within Morocco to Sahrawis who viewed the government favorably, fostering a “coopted elite” within the Sahrawi population and further within the dispute over the territory at
large109. This accompanied with the Algerian influence on the Polisario leaves the Western
Saharan people and their territory at the whim of the states who are using it as a means of
exacting geopolitical power. The periphery status of the actual plight regarding the dissonance of
Sahrawi statehood within the construction of territory in a postcolonial world emphasizes how
impactful the selectiveness of global attention can be on the perception of a disputed territory.
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Both Morocco and Algeria utilize the periphery status that a postcolonial disputed
territory has to the advantage of their own geopolitical power struggle; it can be conducted
outside the confines of their own states, but have the reward of presence and control over another
state and its people. Both countries also have relationships in the EU, and with Israel and Russia,
the former a body that could minimize tensions, but the latter two nations are even larger
powerful states that could influence the conflict militarily, economically, and politically.

Making a Desert and Calling it Peace
The statehood of Western Sahara with concern to the population residing within it and to
the region through identity and history will likely fall further in the periphery as the land itself
becomes increasingly valuable to central global powers. With the current Russian and Ukraine
conflict, global nations reliant on Russian gas are looking for other sources to draw from as a
way of diminishing dependence on Russian exports.
Algeria supplied 11% of Europe’s gas prior to the war and has begun to fill the gap as
countries seek new suppliers amidst the conflict. It also has the world’s third biggest untapped
shale gas reserves, positioning the country as a future energy giant in the global community from
political shifts in export decisions alone110. This is significant in how it might prompt increased
international support of Algeria, upset Morocco especially given historical European supporters
such as Spain changing alliances, and ultimately heighten the animosity between the two nations
to a point of conflict, leaving Western Sahara as a negotiation tool of territory and tension.
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As states fall on either an Algerian or Moroccan side of a dispute over a valuable
resource, the actual plight of allowing for a Western Saharan state to be created is sidelined and
continuously liminal. Countries will align with the viewpoint of either Morocco or Algeria
regarding the disputed territory, negating the fact that neither country has a legitimate reason for
their engagement with Western Sahara. Algeria backs the Polisario as a means of antagonizing
Morocco and in turn Morocco claims legitimacy over the territory as a semblance of postcolonial
restitution, neither situation actually considering the Saharawi people in earnest111.
World powers and organizations like the EU have failed to take a coherent position on
Western Sahara and its legality and legitimacy in addition to any neighbor states like Morocco’s
control over the disputed territory, nor has any support or condemnation been offered concerning
the Polisario Front or Saharawi peoples112. The need to carefully balance economically beneficial
partnerships in the global core eclipses the importance of addressing a people and a nation left in
sovereign limbo and at the mercy of its neighbors. Without the needed attention to the more
human aspect of this disputed territory, the displaced Sahrawi people are left in search of
sovereignty or at least some form of international recognition of their plight and right to exist
through global communal legitimization of Western Sahara as its own nation.
The periphery status of Western Sahara allows Morocco and Algeria to use it as a
strategic and self-interested device of geopolitical prowess, an expansion of defense, or a
bargaining chip in foreign affairs. The liminality of the periphery has shrouded the situation to
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the benefit of powerful states. This in turn has caused a cyclical failure to address the Sahrawi
people and their statehood, the plethora of cultural, social, and economic aspects, and domestic
representation in Africa and internationally, despite integral role the territory plays in the affairs
of other nations. Without some kind of “compromise”113, the Polisario Front, emboldened by
Algeria, and Morocco’s continued oppression and of the Saharawi people, Western Sahara as a
disputed territory will remain a victim of the periphery’s liminality, while outside nations
maximize the benefits of this territorial perception for their own geopolitical strategy and
stature114.

Undiscovered Country
In the case of land-based disputed territory, human history plays an important role as
there is so much more of it that constructs and defines the dispute itself, thus how countries act in
a periphery territorial dispute. Looking at Guyana and Venezuela’s division over the Essequibo
as well as Western Sahara’s search for sovereignty and the various states and international bodies
that have shaped the endeavor, the complexity of disputed territories on land within the periphery
is irrefutable. The periphery here is equally as liminal, but far more malleable given the
permeance of human presence, the preexisting legislation and reach of all countries in such an
environment, and the incredibly central function of history, in these instances, colonialism.
The postcolonial states have their perceptions of territory, sovereignty, and thus identity
deconstructed and rebuilt around the impacts of colonialism; what literal and figurative shape
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they were left in after those foreign powers departed. Even with freedom, these nations are left
without a tangible reason as to why their land was distributed in such a way, or what the
appearance of new divisions, borders, and boundaries mean for their existence in the postcolonial
world. Thus, the outside influence of global powers and their perception of what territory is, a
measure of value and power, exists as the new filter to view land through for these states and
their people.
Even without colonialism, formerly colonialist countries still maintain a presence and
proximity to these nations and exacerbate the problems that bloom out of new territorial conflicts
for their own economic and geopolitical gain, all through the peripheral status of many of these
disputes. Reconstructions from international bodies attempting to remedy postcolonial disputed
territories will almost always fail to remedy anything as the provision of a dissonant and
frequently western concept of territory cannot restore these states or societies to what they were
before colonialism. The concept of territory in today’s world was not how many countries or
people once perceived land, and thus these states are continuously at the whim of how larger and
more powerful nations construct them, and the periphery provides free reign for outside states to
do so with self-interest.
If postcolonial states are able to reap the benefit of their sought-after resources, they can
boost their status in the global community, shape their territorial identities, and use the periphery
to their own, autonomous benefit. The role of history, and complicity of colonial states in
continuing to capitalize off of these nations must be addressed by global international bodies
such as the UN and ICJ. There is long-overdue attention that must be given to the perspective
and objectives of postcolonial nations and peoples, so that they might find clarity and a path
forward regarding disputed land like the Essequibo and Western Sahara.
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Outer Space
Outer space entered the international conversation with magnitude and the promise of
other-worldly power in the Space Race era of the 1960’s. The strategic and geopolitical value, in
addition to the irrefutable demonstration of strength in technological innovation, economic
resources, and state power, drove countries to focus all their efforts on the vast frontier beyond
the confines of earth. Space remained a point of political interest even after it became an
increasingly demystified environment, but as more and more nations established their ability to
reach the stars, semblances of consequence and value began to emerge. The plethora of natural
resources that exist outer space is unimaginable and brimming with financial promise for
countries and private actors alike. Thus, after the initial race to get there, states now have the
ability to define the space, engage in strategic objectives, and even explore.
Although expanse of outer space holds physically endless amounts of area that can be
feasibly thought of as territory, the confines of planets, moons, or just exploration potential is the
most evident way to conceptualize tangible space. In defining territory, ownership, and the right
to exist in space, such a new and vast area, so much depends on the reason for state activities
outside earth to begin with. Outer space is a periphery region logistically, yet despite the
extremely public act of going to space, and international observation and celebration of such a
feat, it holds less of the significance that it did during the Cold War era per say. Space and a
country’s ability to reach it and engage in pursuits that break the confines of diplomatically
tinged endeavors is also something that remains on the periphery, despite the heavy significance
of astronomical advancement.
The intersection between technology, the communalism that space law asks of states
deciding to venture outside of earth, and the evolving definitions of what space really is for
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countries as they explore, and how that impacts their actions are all key elements of this chapter.
Looking at constructed territories like the International Space Station, as well as what the
promise of planetary and lunar exploration means for those involved, logistically and politically,
is demonstrative of how because of its theoretical periphery status, outer space is an important
observational environment for how states choose to conduct themselves. Actions in space and on
the celestial bodies that humans reach can be reflective of earthly foreign affairs, even more
interestingly, it may be entirely oppositional, an example being America and Russia. Space
offers states the hefty condition of cooperation, both legislatively and practically, and that often
distorts preconceived notions of how countries will act toward one another and regarding their
own interests, especially in such a peripheral environment.
Space as a geopolitical arena is a stage for the intersection between security and
technology, and how much state activities outside of earth still can have sizable impact to what
occurs earthside115. The protection, projection, and expansion of national interest in outer space
is a broadening venture in the global political sphere and should hold the same geopolitical
weight as the securitization or militarization of a land territorial conflict. Yet the lack of tangible
constructions when it comes to conceptualizing space in territorially delineated terms, as well as
the precedent of purely peaceful and unified international cooperation portrays this realm beyond
earth as an ill-defined and improbable setting for conflict, a periphery.
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Space Law
At the start of the space race, the United States, the USSR, and the United Nations
General Assembly sought to establish some kind of rules prior to the impending, numerous, and
tension filled years ahead between the great powers and their pursuit of outer space. The
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) became a permanent subsidiary
body of the General Assembly in December 1959 and continued to expand throughout the years
to follow. The purpose and intent of the committee to strengthen “the intentional legal regime
governing outer space” as well as “improve conditions for expanding international cooperation in
this sector”, and asserted a commitment to act on a global level in supporting and advising any
space related situations, entities, and activities116.
The COPUOS as a legal instrument in defining outer space for the states wanting to act
within it existed initially as a lawmaking body. It then evolved as a vehicle to “broaden the
acceptance of the UN space treaties” and “asses their application” within the general field of
international lawmaking117. Of the many efforts this committee worked on, the key piece of
legislation that still plays a central role in how states operate in space is the Declaration of Legal
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. This
resolution outlined and established the commonality of space exploration for all countries,
“irrespective” of any economic or scientific benefit, and solidified that any and all space
exploration and endeavors must be done with “peaceful purposes”, emblemized in the
prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and explosions in space118. These parameters for
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space exploration were by no means rigid, but acted as an international agreement and
establishment for norms regarding state actions in space.
This idea of a common good embedded within the laws for space creates an altruistic
ambiguity in how states can and should act in the realm. Its emphasis on exploration and
communalism is amplified by the explicit assertion of “free access, exploration, and use”, and
the “prohibition of appropriation” of any and all celestial bodies by “claim of sovereignty, by
means or use or occupation, or by any other means”119.
The legislation crafted during the early era of space exploration was tactful in its
structure, recognizing its limits given the scope of what was still unknown about space, but
building what type of environment outer space would be for the countries that sought to act
within it. In establishing peaceful and unity driven purposes for space regarding everything from
activities to conceptualizing space territory, the COPUS built a framework within the context of
the UN, but with room to evolve with the growth in technology thus accessibility to and usage of
outer space by the global community.

Creating Space
From the moment the global community began conceptualizing space as a territory and
realm to engage with, it was given the above-mentioned communalist attributes to be ‘free for
appropriation”, and an area where any “idea of colonizing…as seen in the past in relation to vast
regions of the planet” was made illegal120. This careful balance between space being regarded as
the property for all humanity to share, while maintaining the regard of space exploration to be an
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emblem of individual state success, yet still with concern for the greater good always at the
center of the venture.
In keeping a “ban on sovereignty” as one of the fundamental principles of
conceptualizing space and norms for states to operate under, an intentional lack of structure
emerges as what defines the region121. In essence, to create such a specific framework to prevent
states from engaging in territorial disputes and conflict over the right to or ownership of any
celestial bodies or space, these principles have almost undermined the international legal
framework. States are less inclined to establish, facilitate, or follow their own regulations, nor
hold themselves and others in “compliance” as the existing legislature maintains the ill-defined
nature of space, thus there is not a “prerequisite to performance” regarding how states engage in
their business within space122.
The potential for such unbridled self-interest regarding state actions in space
demonstrates the importance of construction in such a new and peripheral environment. To an
extent, there was a “fear” of how states could, should, and would act in space, especially at the
start of the space race with such high tensions123. This fear also extended to how actions in and
ownership of space territory would impact sovereignty and the legal status quo on earth.
The peripheral existence, along with the legislative pillars committing to an expansive,
communally driven, benevolently explorative, and guided purpose in space leaves global powers
with an interest in outer space the ability to construct the region with much flexibility. The
intangibility and distance renders outer space and its celestial bodies more difficult to
conceptualize feasibly on earth, and as more states reach liminal areas of space and possess the
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technology to begin inhabiting a planet or moon per say, space will undergo another
transformation in its construction within international groups. Because there is no permanence in
space, its disputed territories are intertwined with how far countries get in experiencing and
defining them, leaving the construction of space fluid and everchanging. In essence, there will
always be disputed territory in space so long as it continues to be explored, making it a territory
that is constructed by its constant change.

Regime and Cosmopolitan Sovereignty Theory
Outer space is not a territory in its traditional definition, it has essentially been
constructed as a global commons, belonging to all, and because our society operates as a system
conceived and rooted in “territorial notions of sovereignty”, there is a certain amount of selfdefinition with respect to outer space that is left up to the individual state124. Regime theory
asserts that states go about determining the benefit of cooperation of large issue areas, such as
outer space, and by agreeing to rules and decision-making processes, they might exert their
sovereignty and interests125. In this way, regime theory is helpful in understanding how states
view this territory and act within it.
With this theory in mind, how states as rational actors interact in outer space, combined
with the discussed attributes of space law, and the peripheral nature as another layer of liminality
on the environment, there is a dichotomy that emerges. Space is meant to be viewed as a neutral,
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shared territory, yet the human-made objects, and equipment in space are essentially an
extension of state’s sovereign territory126. Regimes within outer space are constructed where
sovereignty can exist, in tangible bodies like technological hardware, and responsibility over
these vehicles of territory in effect belongs to the state launching or utilizing them. While there is
accountability for any damage done by these objects in a collision or crash type scenario, the
individual objects are “subject to the launching state’s domestic legislation” and once they reach
space, are still treated as “objects belonging to the launching state, in a setting of neutral
territory”127.
In addition to regime theory, cosmopolitan sovereignty provides a lens to view how
states, whether intentional or not, utilize the periphery status of outer space and unlink the notion
of sovereignty from territory in a traditional sense, and adopting new ways to facilitate power
through means that disrupt preconceptions of what territorial possession is. Outer space as a
territory is not disputed in previously discussed manners like maritime zones or land because the
baseline definition of what sovereignty is and exists as in the realm is wider, rooted in global
community and common humanity, and is thus constructed, viewed, and acted upon in an
entirely different way.
The role of countries and their self-interest is still central in this, even though the states,
sovereignty, and the construction of territory seems to break down in the global legislative
bodies’ construction of space. These two theories are important in establishing how territory is
thought of, thus acted upon differently in outer space. However, that does not mean that state
intentions, especially given this environment resides on the periphery, are not consistent with the
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argument of this work. State behavior with regard to disputed territory is still deeply
constructivist and based in social nuances, adheres to the ties between territorial possession and
power, and illuminates true state intentions in realms far from the core of international affairs.
The key difference is the environment this occurs in, outer space, and how certain conceptual
frameworks that usually “precede interpretation” must be reexamined before fully engaging with
the affairs of space and “wider world politics”128.

Strength and Scrutiny of Satellites
As esoteric as all this may seem, establishing outer space as an environment in which
Earth resides in, and thinking of space as an almost nested, albeit boundless, expanse in which
international relations and foreign affairs may be conducted is helpful in conceptualizing the
events that occur within it129. While space exploration into the never-ending frontier seems to be
the core and emphasized intention of establishing global political objectives for outer space,
many of the most overlooked and peripheral debates of sovereignty in space are occurring just
outside the atmosphere: satellites.
Near-Earth space is the region closest to Earth, where low-Earth orbits of technology like
satellites reside. With the increased privatization of satellites by both NGOs and private
companies such as SpaceX or Lockheed Martin, this area has become increasingly crowded with
a new generation of low-cost, small satellites, that are used for everything from scientific
research to security surveillance. Given the lack of supervision of this area which instead goes to
the aforementioned outlined principles of extended and collective space exploration, an
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escalation of using near-Earth space via satellites as an extension of tangible territory claims on
earth and in the surrounding outer space areas is of significance.
The periphery status of this area, and the lack of constructable bounds and observation
outside facilitates the benefits of an underregulated and minimally monitored activity zones for
countries seeking to use satellites for their own self-interest, which is frequently for surveillance
and rooted in security efforts. While satellite imagery can be used to reveal large swathes of
territory and sovereignty via images of regions plagued by environmental and humanitarian
issues so to illustrate scale and impact to the general public, this technology can also “control
information about developments in…territories, states” and “break” state-led discourses on
territorial disputes due to how much information can be revealed130.
The periphery status of a satellite and its ability to ‘reveal” the “hidden or unknown” with
regard to territory on earth empowers a certain visual activism for states and the nongovernmental organizations that might use the data from this technology as a means of
accountability in earthside territorial disputes131. From the periphery of space, using a vehicle for
“distant observation”, states and non-state actors alike have the capacity to participate in affairs
of disputed territories, and make claims on contested environments like never before, all from a
non-earth viewpoint132.
This kind of liminal existence provides states the capacity to act in self-interest by
defining the territory, and also work to reduce lengthy and potentially violent conflicts over
disputed territories by utilizing the visual knowledge made available from satellite technology.
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The communalism of space combined with the scope of perspective made available from this
near-earth area and the technology used in the space fosters the prospect of earthside cooperation
over territorial disputes due to the absolute clarity on earth and its various disputed
environments.
However, newfound territory and a rush of state and non-state actors to lay claims and
operate within such an environment echoes the colonialist and imperialist histories of humanity
that never ended well. Given that space is uninhabited, the comparison is not a perfect fit, but
that same scarcity mentality and ill-defined definition of a given space permitting a “first-come
first-claim strategy” on satellite operations and utilization in the near-earth space may undermine
what is meant to be viewed as a “shared sky”133.
If space laws are not maintained for private actors and industries, the communalism of
outer space territorial respect regarding various endeavors may be undermined. With the
demonstrated impact and influence of near-earth orbit satellites, states and private actors alike
could become increasingly inclined to utilize the environment, pushing it out of the periphery
and forcing more explicit legislation prevent any conceivably harmful ground-based
repercussions. The championing of space being a “collaborative and peaceful endeavor” is
imperative in delegitimizing any “militarization, colonization…and tension”, and allowing actors
to continue to use the periphery in a productive manner134.
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The International Space Station
The ISS is the most tangible example of the cooperative and global commons outlook of
space as it was conceptualized with the arrival of humans in outer space in the 1950’s and 60’s.
As a shared vessel of scientists and astronauts from different countries across the world, even
states with contentious relationships such as Russia and the United States, coexisting as emblems
of human achievement and advancement. The cooperation that emerged out of the space race and
through the Cold War Era combined with a limited about of physical space in geostationary orbit
forced a proximity between the competing countries, but also incentivized cordiality with the
promise of shared resources in technological advancement135.
In thinking about the ISS as a periphery territory, its distance from earth, the inhospitable
nature of space surrounding, as well as the physical structure of it being a communal vessel are
important to acknowledge. Given the construction of territory as a concept was formed with
terrestrial environments in mind, and space’s notable absence of such typical geopolitical norms,
the ISS acts in a way as a more tangible if not concrete concept of territory in space. However,
given the defined space laws that disrupt any individual ownership and territorial claims, the
station is an example of a manmade craft or territorial body that exists only in space, and adheres
to the communalist and global norms of outer space in its shared existence. It also serves as a
defiance of earthside political divisions for the most part, as the constructed territory is only
functional and habitable if the various nations who use it share their resources and knowledge.
The International Space Station is also a point of power in space, countries who have
individuals residing in the station possess a shared responsibility when it comes to collecting
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space debris, identifying potential collisions, and warning endangered satellites of impending
damage from space debris. Given the back-and-forth shift of control between American and
Russian space resources for ISS related launches, and cooperative launches between Russian and
Western companies for commercial satellite launches, the space station and these pursuits are
demonstrative of the need for state collaboration in extraterrestrial pursuits136.

Celestial Cooperation and Conflict
Just as the International Space Station embodies the necessity of cooperation in liminal
periphery environments such as space, another important element of space in international
relations is fostering “complex interdependence”137. Space and its separation from earth creates a
further dimension on what an interstate territory means and operates as. The disruption of the
typical confines of earth and the operational or expected norms in foreign affairs may alter states
typical self-interest directed actions as seen into the periphery. This is to say that their decisions
are still candidly self-serving, but the nature of space may temporarily guise those priorities in
communalism for the sake of carving out legitimacy.
During the 2014 Annexation of Crimea, the outer space alliance and reliance between
Russia and the United States seemed to go largely undisturbed by the sanctions occurring on
earth. The complete dependence of American astronauts on Russian space shuttles at the time
was likely a part of that, but even when both countries faced financial difficulties during the
collapse of the Soviet Union and U.S. budget cuts in the late 90’s, the countries remained
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committed to keeping the joint space programs aloft138. This complex interdependence and its
ability for positive political growth would otherwise not exist in the confines of earthside state
relations. However, as seen in other terrestrial periphery dynamics, the unstable norms and
structures ensures that despite positive changes in state interests in the spirit of communality, the
countries will always revert to their own individual concerns and pursuits.
The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted global tensions and reactions,
notably the intense economic sanctions from across the globe, especially from the United States.
This animosity has not been confined to earth, with Russia’s Space Chief raising concern given
how some of the sanctions were specifically aimed at the space program, and prompted a
statement that the Russian space organization, Roscosmos, would rescind its technological
support from the International Space Station139.
The breakdown in the international cooperation of space not only pushes it out of the
periphery, but erodes the few norms and principles established at the inception of space
occupation by global powers during the Space Race. Should such a sizable emblem of this
cooperation and communal nature of space be dismantled if Russia were to pull its support, it
would set an uneasy precedent for the future of space exploration, and potentially lay the
groundwork for a far more divided, securitized, and hostile disputed territory dynamic.
Space being an environment largely controlled, pursued, and constructed by American
and Russian activity, the breakdown in this cooperation due to tensions on earth would end
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nearly three decades of teamwork through certainly trying times. This power dynamic between
the two countries, and the complex interdependence of NASA on Roscosmos and vice versa so
to keep the ISS operational means that in order to keep the shared technology, advancement, and
resources, the two countries would have to continue getting along. A “waning commitment”
from one or both of the countries could spell an individualistic space exploration environment,
one that either goes further into the periphery given the necessity of secrecy and leverage or
require that international bodies create more defining legislation and regulation to curb any
confrontational escalations140.

Moon Shot
Beyond the International Space Station, the Moon is the only other celestial body which
humans have physically set foot on, the key difference with the Moon being it is not human
made. It’s been many years since man has last walked on the surface of the Moon, but it has once
again started to garner attention in the international community with NASA’s Artemis Program,
and the signing of the Artemis Accords, an agreement aimed at “facilitation international
collaboration on sustainable human exploration projects”, specifically regarding a human return
to the Moon by 2024141. These accords have drawn criticism from some, implying that they favor
American objectives and potentially allow for deviation from the Outer Space Treaty in
permitting claiming ownership over space resources142.
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The Artemis Accords are demonstrative of the challenges in constructing and operating
within space to begin with, but also on a tangible body like the Moon. In outlining how states
will operate on the Moon in years to come, the Accords in comparison with the Space Treaty
furthers how when there are little defining legal constructions in a periphery and disputed
territory, states will act in their own self-interest, often openly. A specific example of this would
be in Section 10, paragraph 2 of the Accords, where the interpretation of the Space Treaty’s
section on non-appropriation of celestial bodies is reconstructed: the extraction of space
resources is explicitly redefined as an act that is not a constitution of national appropriation143.
In establishing that the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute
national appropriations, the Artemis Accords are not an immediate change to how space and
ownership is viewed, and it is not a comprehensive breakdown of the Space Treaty. It does
however demonstrate an active move, in the periphery given the small number of states that have
signed and the minimal coverage, for countries seeking to establish ownership and status in outer
space, with regard to occupiable bodies like the Moon.
The Moon, and any further celestial bodies that humans reach face the challenging task of
existing as communal territory and property, under the guise of exploration. But measure of
power and achievement in space for countries is expanding beyond just exploration. The
opportunity to discover and utilize available resources as well as the conceptualization of what
norms in such a liminal environment might exist is a lofty yet advantageous task essentially
given to the state that gets there first.
This balancing act between communality and making use of planets and moons manifests
as a “loophole”, and combined with possessing a periphery status, outer space is a burgeoning
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environment for land-grab type scenarios and prospecting for valuable resources that is echoic of
the gold rush or the age of imperialism144. The only conceivable place for future disputes of
space and space materials to be resolved would be earth, a distant arena and lacking in tangible
reach and impact given the perceived steadfast communalism of space and necessity to build a
global authoritative yet observational body that encapsulates these principles.
The vastness and periphery nature of space can conceal the fact that feasibly reachable
celestial environments for economic activity are limited, which will drive the competition
between those aspiring to establish a presence and power in the cosmos. With the growth in
private companies only serving to muddle the construction of norms and rules for state and nonstate actors to follow in this realm, the Moon is the closest and already most complex periphery
environment for interested parties to navigate.

Life on Mars?
Perhaps even more compelling and liminal than the Moon is Mars. As a planet with
promise for not just resource extraction but as an environment to explore, better understand our
planet’s origin, and even a place to inhabit and build on given the questionable trajectory of
Earth with climate change, it is truly a frontier environment awaiting the arrival of humanity.
Mars currently exemplifies how communalism in space works, with robotic reconnaissance and
surface exploration, it is an environment primarily utilized for scientific research and
understanding how life once existed on the red planet. However, this characterization is likely
ephemeral given the promise such a territory holds.
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Due to its similarity to Earth, Mars is constructed as the closest area where human life
might be sustained and grown in the future, and even with the technological challenges to
overcome in achieving that, the prospect of a permanent human residence on different planet is
becoming less esoteric145. Just like the rest of outer space, a human occupation of Mars will
require global coordination to adhere to the pre-existing space laws, as well as the engagement of
more nations in space exploration itself146. The provision of such a challenging but necessarily
shared and peaceful activity as the individual states’ actions continue to define what occurs on
Mars is integral to preventing the potential conflict at the opportunity for valuable new territory.
China landed its first rover on Mars in early 2021, making it the third nation behind
Russia and the United States to have technology on the actual ground of the planet. The United
Arab Emirates successfully got a satellite into Mars' orbit and European Space Agency has plans
to send their own in the near future147. As the red planet receives more and more technology
from a growing number of countries as an extension of their presence, it will undoubtably foster
a shift in how Mars is defined as a territory, and how the periphery impacts state actions. The
sharing of scientific information in the context of better understanding the planetary origins of
earth and space itself is one thing, but the discovery of valuable resources, or tools that might
help one country begin to establish a more permanent presence on the planet and sustain life
could begin to disrupt the careful peace that exists currently.
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The vested interest of countries to actually get to Mars was only the initial portion of the
endeavor. Just like the Moon, the promise of actually inhabiting or reaping lucrative benefits
from a celestial body was once a far-fetched idea, thus the absence of comprehensive legislation
for space and the necessity for it going forward. As more states join this pursuit, it could push
Mars out of the periphery and into becoming an emblem for what a more legislatively defined
celestial body looks like, or it may further how the periphery shrouds state actions from the
global community’s attention, allowing them to act with their truest intentions and self-interest.
Either way, future state endeavors around and on planets will redefine how outer space as
a disputed territory is viewed and acted upon, and the question of territorial ownership over
resources and even swathes of land on these celestial bodies is not hypothetical, it is inevitable. If
legislative bodies are not formed for this eventuality in human discovery, or legislation itself is
not created by the preexisting powers at be, Mars is poised to become a disputed territory where
imperialist history of conflict and strife might repeat itself. A burgeoning tangible frontier of
space exists for both countries and private actors alike to define, utilize for their own benefit, and
fight over.

Per Aspera Ad Astra
To look at space and all its contents through the lens of geopolitics is not a means of
synthesizing it down to just what political actors and various countries have discovered or hope
to discover in the near future. Understanding space is to comprehend a complex but highly
informative case study on disputed territory and the impact of periphery existence on state
actions. Outer space has the capacity to tell the careful observer much about state actors and their
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intentions for the future both on Earth and off it, given the liminal environment and vaguely
defined legislation currently surrounding much of space activity.
As with previous examples of disputed territories, a communality amongst states for the
sake of mutual gain and progression in utilizing the resources of a given realm is a frequent
occurrence in the periphery and space is no exception. Countries operate differently in the
periphery, and especially in space, out of necessity and to maintain the benefits that a periphery
status, both logistically and theoretically, affords. The lack of careful observation and legislative
constructions provides states the ability to define the environment for themselves, and with the
endless expanse of space, the opportunities are limitless.
Space, planets, moons, and anything else residing outside Earth’s atmosphere technically
belongs to all, it is a territory defined by its openness and existence built on cooperation. Thus,
the idea of disputing the contents of space, like valuable resources on Mars or technological
assets and control on the International Space Station, disrupts the coexistence that prescribes
periphery benefits. Outer space entering the center of international discourse and affairs is not a
hypothetical, it is an eventuality, but how it exists in that dialogue depends on what elevates it to
such a prominence.
There is no feasible way for a state to claim an entire planet or moon or any amount of
space as its own, at least not in an imaginable way given the current and conceivable future
technologies. Thus, to an extent, there will always be a mutual collaboration needed in space
given the immense challenge of human existence outside of Earth. The benefit of space is the
liminality that it exists in now, which bolsters the lack of detailed and defined legislation that
exists for maritime zones as a comparison; space and its contents have the capacity to be used by
all who can reach, and thereby can benefit all humankind back on earth. Whether countries
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choose to go about their space endeavors in such a benevolent way, especially given the promise
of economic gain and such an extension of power that completely undefined territory has, there
is not a resounding answer.
Space should not be overlooked because of its distance, limited amount of states currently
operating in the realm, or the ill-defined nature of the periphery environment. It is an immensely
valuable observational realm for states acting so differently than they might on earth, or in the
core of international political attention. There is not a precise prediction regarding what
countries, state actors, and non-state bodies can and will accomplish in such a liminal territory,
and how outer space and all its celestial bodies will evolve in their perception and definition over
time, thus, there is much to still be learned from how we navigate our presence in the cosmos.
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Conclusion
This thesis started with a reference to the connection between territory and comfort,
understanding the varied environments in our world and just outside it within the confines of
clear-cut territorial belonging and ownership, which allows us to view everything in a neatly
ordered fashion. Disputed territory prompts fissures in that vision, and the impact of the
periphery on those regions disrupts any preconceptions of state behavior, objectives, and
existences within these realms. The liminality of the periphery and its effect on disputed
territories facilitates a microcosm of state interaction, a viewpoint from which true political,
economic, and social intentions are visible, and can be used to better predict what those same
countries will do in the global core.
Through examining case studies in a variety of domains, this theory not only holds true,
but shows how crucial the periphery is in prompting such unique state behavior. The dynamic of
accessible state action in self-interest, yet the maintenance of adversarial cooperation that the
periphery asks of countries is a significant but seemingly contradictory compromise. Alas the
liminality aspect of these disputed territories is that this circumstance in its entirety is only
observable for as long as states follow the theoretical ground rules of the arrangement. These
disputed territories are constructed by the periphery and the necessary state actions that sustain it,
which are in turn incentivized by the geopolitical and strategic benefits that exist in these
environments. This interaction and blend of forces and factors that comprises the periphery is
part of what makes it all so challenging for international legislative bodies to see and operate
within, and that in itself demonstrates why this is immensely valuable to study.
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Across the chapters and examples of this work, there are some integral conclusions to be
drawn about the merit of this argument and importance in considering it within further research
of geopolitical and peripheral affairs.
First, the belief that all disputed territories worth studying and analyzing are already
mapped, covered extensively, or readily visible must be suspended. An active pursuit into the
seemingly obscure or esoteric disputed territories that reside in the periphery can offer
unparalleled insight. Second, the periphery affordance of self-interest outside the confines of
international norms and laws with the caveat of inimical cooperation to sustain the liminality of
the environment can reveal far more about what states are actually planning to do in the global
core, especially helping to predict the future intentions of countries more accurately. Last,
disputed territory in the periphery does not always look like the traditional conception of a
territorial dispute, because the periphery cannot be sustained when there is conflict.
Territory is a mosaic of history, emotion, power, politics, and identity. In environments as
familiar as land and as recondite as the cosmos, we will continue to evolve, reconstruct, and
dispute the conception of territory and human possession over it indefinitely. It is an
advantageous and worthwhile pursuit to observe and learn from state interactions in these
situations, but the expanse of it all can be daunting. Thus, the periphery acts as an observation
point with specific barriers to entry, an array of states to study, and a liminal existence that
provides a feasible breadth of disputed territories; all components that help to foster sagacious
geopolitical foreign policy.
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